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Insubstantial Burdens: The Case for Government
Employee Exemptions to Same-Sex Marriage
Laws
Robin Fretwell Wilson*
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

The case for accommodating religious objectors to same-sex marriage has met
significant resistance on a number of fronts. Some believe that religious exemptions
permit objectors to dodge legal duties to serve same-sex couples that would otherwise
apply.1 Critics charge that, if extended to public employees, such exemptions would
burden the ability of same-sex couples to marry.2 Others argue that exemptions coddle
*

Class of 1958 Law Alumni Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law. This
Article draws on a series of letters I co-authored about the religious liberty implications of same-sex
marriage laws sent to legislators in jurisdictions considering legislation. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas C.
Berg, Carl H. Esbeck, Robin Fretwell Wilson, and Richard W. Garnett to Sen. Bill Baroni, New Jersey
(Dec. 4, 2009), available at http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/wilson-et-al-to-governor-maine100509.pdf. It also draws on Robin Fretwell Wilson, Matters of Conscience: Lessons for Same-Sex
Marriage from the Healthcare Context, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING
CONFLICTS 77 (Douglas Laycock, Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., & Robin Fretwell Wilson eds., 2008). I am
grateful to Kent Greenawalt; Mark Grunewald; Lewis LaRue; Paul Secunda; Marc Stern; the participants of
the Journal of Law and Social Policy’s 2009 Symposium, “Same-Sex Marriage and Religious
Accommodation: Determining the Role of the Legislature”; the Annual Law & Religion Roundtable at
Brooklyn Law School; and the panel at Harvard Law School on “Questions of Conscience? Religious
Exemptions for Same-Sex Marriage Laws” for their thoughtful comments and critiques. Many thanks to
Joe Mercer, George Davis, Julie Arrington, Will Bridges, Merilys Huhn, and Anthony Michael Kreis for
invaluable research assistance.
1
Kelly Wentzel, Op-ed, Separate Isn’t Equal, L.A. TIMES, May 10, 2009,
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/may/10/opinion/le-sunday10.S4 (response to Robin Fretwell Wilson, Oped, The Flip-Side of Same-Sex Marriage, L.A. TIMES, May 3, 2009,
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/may/03/opinion/oe-wilson3, arguing that photographers fined by the New
Mexico Human Rights Commission for refusing to photograph a same-sex commitment ceremony “were
fined for anti-discrimination laws that say you cannot discriminate based on religion, race, gender, age or
sexual orientation. So let’s get this straight: [Wilson] is calling for people to be allowed to break the exact
laws that protect their religious freedom and then demand that the law they broke also protect them.”).
2
Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Same-Sex Family Equality and Religious Freedom, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC.
POL’Y 274, 294 (2010) (“[U]nder both the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment, and related
equality provisions of state constitutions, [] state officers have duties of equal respect to all persons within
the state. It is very difficult to see how one can square such a duty with a right, religion-based or otherwise,
to refuse to provide public services to a particular class of individuals.”). See also Kevin T. Freeman,
Separate Isn’t Equal, L.A. TIMES, May 10, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/may/10/opinion/lesunday10.S4 (response to Wilson, The Flip-Side of Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 1, arguing that with
religious liberty exemptions, “Americans will live in ‘separate’ peace and equality. Separate cannot be, by
its very nature, equal. Are gay people citizens or aren’t they?”); Comment by XpeopleWHATon to Robin
Fretwell Wilson, A Marriage Equality Bill that Respects Religious Objectors, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2009,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/26/AR2009102601653.html (“I agree
with the disagree-ers of this article...substitute the word ‘black’ or ‘Jewish’ or ‘asian’ or ‘woman’ or ‘man’
for GAY, and if it doesn't work to exclude any existing group of humanity, it doesn't work to exclude
humans who are gay. Welcome to the new millennium, where we will thank you for becoming a real
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wrong-headed people who really do not have a legitimate reason for objecting and who,
therefore, should not be legally excused.3
For many people, the acceptability of religious objections varies with the size of the
objector’s business.4 Others are willing to exempt church-affiliated organizations from
directly facilitating same-sex marriage, but draw the line at objections by vendors of
commercial services needed by couples when they marry, such as reception halls,
flowers, or photographs.5 Some are willing to exempt both individuals and groups who
object for religious reasons to facilitating a same-sex marriage so long as they perform no
government functions and receive no public funds.6
A review of the nearly half-dozen new same-sex marriage laws enacted in the past
year suggests that the least sympathetic of these potential objectors is the government
employee whose labor is supported by taxpayers, heterosexual and homosexual alike.
The states that have embraced meaningful religious liberty protections7 have exempted
human being and not supporting segregation.”).
3
Comment by anarcho-liberal-tarian to Wilson, A Marriage Equality Bill, supra note 2 (“Tolerate
intolerance? Not a chance. Bigotry is bigotry, even if they're pretending God told them to do so.”).
4
For example, some commentators would permit exemptions for small businesses but not large ones.
Professor Alan Brownstein, the Boochever and Bird Chair for the Study and Teaching of Freedom and
Equality at U.C. Davis School of Law, argued in the L.A. Times that:
[I]t may be appropriate for small businesses such as wedding photographers or caterers to be
granted religious exemptions that allow them to decline to provide personal services at weddings
for same-sex couples. But large businesses and obvious places of accommodation—the places
where public life in our society takes place—should be open to everyone. A large hotel should
have no more right to refuse to provide reception facilities for a same-sex wedding on religious
grounds than to refuse to provide the reception for a bar mitzvah on religious grounds.
Alan Brownstein, Op-ed, Religious Freedom and Gay Marriage Can Coexist: Some Accommodations for
Religious Exemptions Should Be Made in States That Recognize Same-Sex Marriage, But Not All
Discrimination Should Be Tolerated, L.A. TIMES, May 11, 2009,
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/opinionla/la-oew-brownstein11-2009may11,0,426780.story.
5
Comment by seller11 to Brownstein, supra note 4 (“Obviously goods and services to the general public
should have no more protections for bias against same sex weddings than they do for bias against mixed
race weddings. If their conscience bothers them, maybe they are in the wrong business. And similarly,
churches should not get to push their beliefs onto their employees by denying benefits. . . . There is no
reason for the government to recognize a right to bigotry in civil matters.”).
6
For example, Lara Schwartz, Legal Director and Chief Legislative Counsel for the Human Rights
Campaign, addressed the tension between faith and work at a panel discussion at The Brookings Institution.
Evoking her father, she discussed her work on habeas petitions of prisoners on death row while working as
a judicial clerk for the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Despite her own moral
objections to capital punishment, she soldiered through, noting that her father pointed out to her that “[i]t
was [her] job, that’s why they call it work, Lara, and that’s why they call it the United States of America,
where we are bound to the mast.” Lara Schwartz, Legal Director and Chief Legislative Counsel, Human
Rights Campaign, Remarks at a Panel Discussion at The Brookings Institution: Same-Sex Marriage and
Religious Liberty: A Reconciliation (Mar. 13, 2009) (transcript available at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2009/0313_marriage/20090313_marriage.pdf). See also
Comment by roberta3 to Wilson, A Marriage Equality Bill, supra note 2 (“Very simple test . . . substitute
‘African-American’ or ‘Jew’ for ‘gay’ and if the discrimination in question is OK for one of those, then it is
OK for ‘gay.’ If not, then taxpayers should not support the organization with a tax exemption. They can
believe anything that they want, but the rest of us should not be required to support those beliefs with our
tax dollars.”).
A related critique maintains that marriage registrars and clerks merely stamp and file applications but do
not perform an act of great religious moment; as a consequence, facilitating a same-sex marriage should
not, and could not, burden their conscience in the way that actually performing the ceremony would. I am
indebted to Professor Paul Secunda for this observation.
7
Some enacted and proposed exemptions insulate clergy and churches from the duty to solemnize samesex marriages—hollow protection since “[n]o one seriously believes that clergy will be forced, or even
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religious groups and individuals authorized to preside over marriage ceremonies. But not
a single state has shielded the government employee at the front line of same-sex
marriage, such as a marriage registrar who, if she has a religious objection to same-sex
marriage, will almost certainly face a test of conscience. Thus, states providing for
religious exemptions have insulated from suit private religious groups that refuse to
provide “services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges” for the
solemnization of same-sex marriage.8 They have also insulated private religious groups
from being penalized by the government for such refusals.9 These statutes have
exempted individuals authorized to celebrate marriage from having to solemnize a samesex marriage.10 One state, Connecticut, has exempted religious organizations that
provide “adoption, foster care or social services,” like Catholic Charities, from the duty to
asked, to perform marriages that are anathema to them.” Marc Stern, Same-Sex Marriage and the
Churches, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 1 (Douglas Laycock,
Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., & Robin Fretwell Wilson eds., 2008) [hereinafter SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY]. For instance, Vermont’s same-sex marriage law provides that it “does not require a
member of the clergy authorized to solemnize a marriage . . . to solemnize any marriage, and any refusal to
do so shall not create any civil claim or cause of action.” VT. STAT. ANN. tit.18, § 5144(b) (2009). See
also Religious Freedom and Civil Marriage Equality Amendment Act of 2009, D.C. CODE § 46-406 (2010);
An Act to End Discrimination in Civil Marriage and Affirm Religious Freedom, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
19-A, § 650 (repealed 2009); B. A07732 § 4, 2009–2010 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2009).
Other exemptions provide “protection” that is coterminous with constitutional guarantees. For instance,
Maine’s same-sex marriage law—recently repealed by referendum in a people’s veto—expressly “does not
authorize any court or other state or local governmental body, entity, agency or commission to compel,
prevent or interfere in any way with any religious institution's religious doctrine, policy, teaching or
solemnization of marriage within that particular religious faith's tradition as guaranteed by the Maine
Constitution, Article 1, Section 3 or the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.” ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 650. See also D.C. CODE § 46-406.
As I and others have argued elsewhere, the idea of “forced officiating” is “a distraction from real
situations where religious conscience [may be] at risk.” Letter from Robin Fretwell Wilson et al., to Chet
Culver, Governor, Iowa (July 9, 2009) (on file with author).
8
See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9 § 4502(l) (2009) (“Any refusal to provide services, accommodations,
advantages, goods, or privileges in accordance with this subsection shall not create any civil claim or cause
of action.”); see also D.C. CODE § 46-406(e)(2) (“A refusal to provide services, accommodations, facilities,
or goods in accordance with this subsection shall not create any civil claim or cause of action.”).
9
See An Act Implementing the Guarantee of Equal Protection under the Constitution of the State for Same
Sex Couples, 2009 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 09-13, § 17 (“Any refusal to provide services, accommodations,
advantages, facilities, goods or privileges in accordance with this section shall not create any civil claim or
cause of action, or result in any state action to penalize or withhold benefits from such religious
organization, association or society, or any nonprofit institution or organization operated, supervised or
controlled by or in conjunction with a religious organization, association or society.”); see also D.C. CODE
§ 46-406(e)(2).
Other states provide an exemption without specifying more. See An Act Affirming Religious Freedom
Protections with Regard to Marriage, N.H. REV. STAT ANN. § 457:37 (2010) (providing that certain
“religious organizations” shall “not be required to provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities,
goods, or privileges . . . if related to the solemnization of a marriage, the celebration of a marriage, or the
promotion of marriage . . . in violation of his or her religious beliefs and faith”).
10
See 2009 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 09-13, § 7(a) (“No member of the clergy authorized to join persons in
marriage pursuant to section 46b-22 of the general statutes shall be required to solemnize any marriage in
violation of his or her right to the free exercise of religion guaranteed by the first amendment to the United
States Constitution or section 3 of article first of the Constitution of the state.”); D.C. CODE § 46-406(e)(1);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 5144(b) (providing in part that “[t]his section does not require a member of the
clergy or [certain specified religious societies] to solemnize any [particular] marriage”).
Maine’s same-sex marriage law would have exempted any “person authorized to join persons in
marriage” who refuses “to join persons in marriage [from] any fine or other penalty for such failure or
refusal.” ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 650.
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place children with same-sex couples if the organization receives no public funds,11 while
two states, Vermont and New Hampshire, have exempted fraternal benefit societies, like
the Knights of Columbus, from extending benefits to same-sex spouses.12 A single state,
New Hampshire, exempts individual objectors who work for a religious organization
from the duty to solemnize, celebrate, or promote same-sex marriages if doing so would
violate “religious beliefs and faith.”13
A clear trend emerges from these statutes: states at the leading edge of same-sex
marriage legislation have disproportionately insulated large religious institutions and
their employees from the conflicts ushered in by same-sex marriage, while doing
relatively little for individual believers. Notably absent from these early protections are
marriage registrars, clerks working in the licensing office, and others who may be asked
to facilitate same-sex marriages despite their own deeply held religious beliefs.
This Article takes up what is arguably the hardest case for accommodation:
exemptions for government employees, namely clerks, working in a state marriage
registrar’s office, because a rich substrate of empirical evidence can assist to evaluate the
wisdom of exemptions.14 As others have rightly observed, “If any analysis evaluating the
costs of granting or failing to grant accommodations is going to be persuasive, it has to
demonstrate to both sides of the same-sex marriage debate that the costs and burdens they
are being asked to bear are accurately described and acknowledged.”15 This Article
argues that government employees who have religious objections should be permitted to
step aside from facilitating same-sex marriages when it poses no hardship for same-sex
couples. In other words, when another willing clerk would gladly perform the necessary
11

2009 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 09-13, § 19 (“Nothing in this act shall be deemed or construed to affect the
manner in which a religious organization may provide adoption, foster care or social services if such
religious organization does not receive state or federal funds.”).
12
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8 § 4501(b) (“The civil marriage laws shall not be construed to affect the ability of a
society to determine the admission of its members as provided in section 4464 of this title, or to determine
the scope of beneficiaries in accordance with section 4477 of this title, and shall not require a society that
has been established and is operating for charitable and educational purposes and which is operated,
supervised, or controlled by or in connection with a religious organization to provide insurance benefits to
any person if to do so would violate the society’s free exercise of religion as guaranteed by the First
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States or by Chapter I, Article 3 of the Constitution of
Vermont.”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:37(IV) (2009).
13
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:37(III) (exempting “any individual who is managed, directed, or supervised
by or in conjunction with a religious organization, association, or society . . . [from providing] services,
accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges to an individual if such request . . . is related to
the solemnization of a marriage, the celebration of a marriage, or the promotion of marriage . . . and such
solemnization, celebration, or promotion of marriage is in violation of his or her religious beliefs and
faith”).
14
Thus, the term “government employee” in this Article encompasses marriage registrars, clerks working
in the licensing office, and others who have a ministerial function, but who are not charged with performing
marriages. In many states, Justices of the Peace are authorized marriage celebrants. See, e.g., CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 46b-22 (2009) (“Persons authorized to solemnize marriages in this state include . . . justices of the
peace.”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 207, § 38 (2009) (“A marriage may be solemnized in any place within the
commonwealth by . . . a justice of the peace.”). While the proposed Marriage Conscience Protection, infra
Appendix B, would encompass Justices of the Peace, the lack of available data on Justices of the Peace—as
compared to government employees—makes it difficult practically to assess the impact of a hardship
exemption for Justices of the Peace. Nonetheless, a hardship exemption itself ensures both access to the
status of marriage and religious liberty. See infra Parts II–IV.
15
Alan Brownstein, Gays, Jews, and Other Strangers in a Strange Land: The Case for Reciprocal
Accommodation of Religious Liberty and the Right of Same-Sex Couples to Marry *24 (2010)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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task for a same-sex couple, it is incumbent upon a pluralistic liberal democracy to avoid
forcing a needless choice between one’s beliefs and one’s livelihood. In the case where
another willing clerk is not available, however, the employee’s religious objection must
yield because the state has granted same-sex couples the right to marry. Because this
exemption balances two competing interests, when the lights are on and the doors are
open at the local clerk’s office, same-sex couples may be assured that they will be served
as other members of the public are served.
Part II documents the very real human costs that would flow from denying an
accommodation and recounts a rash of dismissals, disciplinary proceedings, fines, and
warnings leveled at government employees who object for religious reasons to assisting
with same-sex marriage. Drawing on Massachusetts’ experience with same-sex
marriage, this part shows that many government employees simply could not have
anticipated when they began their jobs years before that they would be asked to facilitate
same-sex marriages. Many have built up retirement and other benefits that would be
wiped out if they leave their jobs rather than violate a religious conviction.
Part III then presents a proposed exemption that would allow government
employees to step aside from facilitating same-sex marriages only when it poses no
hardship to same-sex couples. Drawing again on Massachusetts, this part shows that
same-sex marriage licenses constitute a minuscule part of the workload for state clerk
offices, suggesting that staffing around religious objections would pose negligible costs.
Parts IV and V then examine two commonly articulated reasons for dismissing the
need to accommodate government employees: that a religious liberty accommodation
would unconstitutionally burden the right to marry, and that government employees owe
taxpayers service untainted by their private religious beliefs.16
16

Other claims are also made. Some maintain that equality should trump religious liberty. See Lupu &
Tuttle, supra note 2, at 294 (“Thus, under both the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment, and
related equality provisions of state constitutions, such state officers have duties of equal respect to all
persons within the state. It’s very difficult to see how one can square such a duty with a right, religionbased or otherwise, to refuse to provide public services to a particular class of individuals.”). Marc Stern,
Acting Co-Executive Director/General Counsel of the American Jewish Congress, challenges whether
marriage equality claims should prevail in a contest with religious liberty claims. He argues that opponents
of broad protection for religious liberty believe “that the equality interests behind same-sex marriage trump
the liberty interests behind a religious exemption.” Marc Stern, Liberty v. Equality; Equality v. Liberty, 5
NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 307, 311 (2010). For Stern, how one conceives of claims to same-sex marriage
may be outcome determinative. If “[s]een through the prism of individual liberty, it is hard to see why the
states should systematically avoid burdening same-sex couples, no matter how lightly . . . at the expense of
other liberties, including the ability of others to practice their faith. But if the right to same-sex marriage
sounds in equality, not liberty, and the right to equality is given preferential status, then the arguments
against an exemption become plain.” Id. at 314. Stern ultimately sees the resistance to exemptions to
same-sex marriage laws as resting on a moral autonomy claim—namely that “moral choices of citizens
may not be questioned by other citizens, at least not in ways that move beyond the theoretical. One may
not confront an individual’s moral choice directly, or impede him or her in acting on that moral choice.” Id.
at 316. This view, he argues, confuses “immunity from legal impediments to carrying out one’s moral
choices, on the one hand, with a ban on criticism and the refusal to assist in the carrying out of other’s
moral choice on the other hand. The two are not the same.” Id.
Others argue that the very fact that the law would recognize religious objections to same-sex marriage
imposes a dignitary harm on same-sex couples. See Comment by seller11, supra note 5 (“There is no
reason for the government to recognize a right to bigotry in civil matters.”). For a response to this, see
Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Calculus of Accommodation: A Comment on Koppelman and Dent’s ‘Must
Gay Rights Conflict with Religious Liberty?’ (2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
[hereinafter Wilson, The Calculus of Accommodation] (arguing that (1) ideally accommodations should,
and can, be structured so that they are invisible to the public; and (2) that “the possibility of dignitary harm
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Part IV addresses the claim that religious liberty protections will impermissibly
frustrate the right to marry. This part shows that marriage regulations easily survive
constitutional challenge on this ground so long as they do not significantly interfere with
a couple’s ability to marry. This part concludes that, unlike marriage restrictions struck
down by the U.S. Supreme Court, a hardship exemption cannot, by its terms, block
access to the institution of marriage. Part V takes up the claim that government
employees owe the public services untainted by their religious beliefs. It concludes that
there is nothing illegitimate in allowing government employees to step aside from
facilitating same-sex marriage when no one is otherwise burdened. Indeed, federal law
generally demands the reasonable accommodation of a worker’s religious beliefs where it
does not cause an undue hardship for the employer or other employees.17 Ultimately, this
Article concludes that legislation recognizing same-sex marriage provides the flexibility
to affirm two principles deserving of respect in a liberal society, both marriage equality
and religious liberty.
II. THE NEED FOR GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE EXEMPTIONS

¶10

The religious liberty exemptions in the newly enacted marriage laws in Vermont,
Connecticut, New Hampshire, and the District of Columbia all provide protections for
religious organizations but fail to account for individuals other than authorized celebrants
and, in one instance, persons employed by religious institutions. While it remains to be
seen whether large institutions, such as Catholic Charities,18 can weather the financial
will not take policymakers very far because there are two dignitary harms here—the harm to lesbian and
gay couples who are turned aside, and the harm to religious believers who are told that their beliefs are not
to be tolerated . . .”).
17
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2010) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . .
to discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual's religion.”); see also infra Part V
(discussing the requirements of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
18
In fiscal year 2007, Catholic Charities USA reported $24,287,146 in revenue. See CharityNavigator.org,
Catholic Charities USA, http://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?bay=search.summary&orgid=10656
(last visited Aug. 15, 2010). “Approximately 65 percent of [this] revenue [comes] from government
contracts.” Jacqueline L. Salmon, Government Cutbacks Leave Faith-Based Services Hurting, WASH.
POST, Feb. 20, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/02/19/AR2009021903512.html.
The refusal to provide exemptions to such organizations has resulted in tangible costs to religious
organizations and perhaps also the public. In February 2010, the Archdiocese of Washington, D.C., ended
its eighty-year-old foster care placement program rather than approve same-sex couples for placement,
which presumably would be required as a result of D.C.’s nondiscrimination laws and its new same-sex
marriage law. See Michelle Boorstein, Citing Same-Sex Marriage Bill, Washington Archdiocese Ends
Foster-Care Program, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/02/16/AR2010021604899.html; Emily Esfahani Smith, Washington, Gay
Marriage and the Catholic Church, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703478704574612451567822852.html (“By passing gay
marriage, the City Council has put the Catholic Church, or more accurately, the Archdiocese of
Washington, in an awkward position. Either the church will have to recognize gay marriage or it will be
forced to abandon a large portion of its charitable programs.”). Religious adoption placement services have
also shut down. See Robin Fretwell Wilson, A Matter of Conviction: Moral Clashes Over Same-Sex
Adoption, 22 BYU J. PUB. L. 475, 479–83 (2008) [hereinafter Wilson, A Matter of Conviction]
(documenting the exit of religious social services providers and other vendors from the market in the
absence of an exemption); Robin Fretwell Wilson, Matters of Conscience: Lessons for Same-Sex Marriage
from the Healthcare Context, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 7, at 86–90
[hereinafter Wilson, Matters of Conscience] (discussing calls that religious organizations should lose their
tax exemption).
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fall-out from honoring their religious convictions, individuals usually cannot. As a result,
real people are being forced to violate their consciences or pay a hefty price. This part
first documents the dilemma that government employees have encountered in
jurisdictions across the globe and the United States. It then provides concrete examples
of the human costs that would accompany a refusal to provide an accommodation.
A. The Choice Between One’s Beliefs and One’s Job
¶11

In countries with longer experiences with same-sex marriage than the United
States, individuals who object for religious reasons to facilitating same-sex marriages
have been fired from or disciplined in their jobs. In the Netherlands, for example, a
registrar was dismissed after refusing for religious reasons to solemnize the wedding of a
same-sex couple. The registrar was later reinstated by the Commissie Gelijke
Behandeling, which enforces that country’s General Equal Treatment Act.19 As the
Commissie explained, insufficient reasons supported the refusal to renew the registrar’s
contract since other public servants were prepared to assist same-sex couples.20
¶12
In the United Kingdom, a civil marriage registrar, Lillian Ladele, was disciplined
after she refused for religious reasons to act as a registrar for same-sex civil partnerships.
The office in which Ladele worked designated all employees as civil partnership
registrars. Ladele made “informal arrangements with colleagues to swap assignments, so
she avoided officiating at civil partnerships,”21 until two co-workers said “they felt
‘victimised’ by Ms. Ladele not carrying out civil partnership duties.”22 This prompted
“formal disciplinary proceedings . . . on the ground that she ‘had refus[ed] to carry out
[her] work . . . solely on the grounds of sexual orientation of the customers of that
service.’”23 After a hearing, the disciplinary board instructed Ladele to perform civil
partnerships or be terminated. She sued. A unanimous decision of the England and
Wales Court of Appeal ultimately dismissed24 Ladele’s appeal after concluding that, in
the absence of a specific exemption, Ladele’s refusal to “perform civil partnerships . . .
amounts to discrimination.”25

19

E.U. NETWORK OF INDEP. EXPERTS ON FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, OP. NO. 4-2005, THE RIGHT TO
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION AND THE CONCLUSION BY EU MEMBER STATES OF CONCORDATS WITH THE
HOLY SEE, available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/cfr_cdf/doc/avis/2005_4_en.pdf.
20
Id. The Commissie later reversed its position, but was overruled by townships and localities. George
Conger, Dutch Registrars Banned from Refusing to Perform Gay Weddings (Apr. 18, 2008),
http://transfigurations.blogspot.com/2008/04/dutch-registrars-banned-from-refusing.html; Marjolein van
den Brink, ‘I hereby pronounce you . . .’: Conflicting Rights of Same-Sex Bridal Couples and Objecting
Marriage Officials (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
21
Ladele v. Islington LBC, [2009] EWCA Civ 1357, [1]–[78] (Eng.), available at
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2009/1357.html.
22
Id. ¶ 8.
23
Id. ¶ 15.
24
The first body to review the case, the Employment Tribunal, reversed and concluded that “Ms Ladele had
suffered both direct and indirect discrimination, as well as harassment . . . on grounds of her religious
belief. . . .” Id. ¶ 18. That decision was itself reversed by the Employment Appeal Tribunal, which found
that Ladele’s employer was entitled to provide no exemption; Ladele appealed. Id. ¶ 21.
25
While the decision concluded that Ladele’s employer acted correctly once it designated Ladele as a civil
partnership registrar, it “doubt[ed] whether a decision by [the employer] that she would not be designated a
civil partnership registrar, at her request because of her religious problems with officiating at civil
partnerships, would fall foul of the 2007 Regulations.” Id. ¶ 74.

324

Vol. 5:2]

Robin Fretwell Wilson

¶13

In addition to dismissal and discipline, some countries have witnessed a departure
of government employees and contractors from roles they had long performed when
religious exemptions were not forthcoming.26 In Manitoba, Canada, twelve officials
empowered to perform marriage ceremonies quit en masse because they refused to
perform same-sex marriages as required by provincial law.27 In the United Kingdom, a
Christian couple who fostered almost thirty children quit as foster parents after being
asked to sign a contract requiring them to promote a positive view of same-sex
relationships.28 The County Council removed from the couple’s care an eleven-year-old
boy who lived with them for two years and placed him with another family.29
¶14
In the United States, government employees have received a stream of advice and
cautions to serve all persons even if doing so would violate deeply held religious beliefs.
After Massachusetts recognized same-sex marriage in 2003,30 the chief counsel to thenGovernor Mitt Romney told the state’s Justices of the Peace that they must “follow the
law, whether you like it or not.”31 One linchpin of that “law” is Massachusetts’ statute
forbidding discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, which subjects violators to as
much as $50,000 in civil fines.32
¶15
The Iowa Attorney General took a similar position following Iowa’s 2009 same-sex
marriage decision, Varnum v. Brien.33 He told county recorders:
We expect duly-elected county recorders to comply with the Iowa
Constitution as interpreted unanimously by the Iowa Supreme Court, the
highest court in Iowa. Our country lives by and thrives by the rule of law,
and the rule of law means we all follow the law as interpreted by our
courts—not by ourselves. We don’t each get to decide what the law is;
that would lead to chaos. We must live by and follow what the courts
decide.
26

Wilson, A Matter of Conviction, supra note 18, at 479–483.
Bill Graveland, Alberta Allowing Same-Sex Marriage but Adding Protection to Opponents, CAN. PRESS,
July 12, 2005 (on file with author).
28
James Mill, Foster Child To Be Taken Away Because Christian Couple Refuse to Teach Him about
Homosexuality, DAILY MAIL ONLINE, Oct. 23, 2007, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article489285/Foster-child-taken-away-Christian-couple-refuse-teach-homosexuality.html.
29
Id. Local governments in the United Kingdom have also nixed as “unsuitable” for new placements a
Christian couple who had fostered fifteen children after the couple indicated they would share Biblical
teachings about homosexuality if the issue arose. Rachel Harden, ‘Unsuitable’ foster-parents to appeal,
CHURCH TIMES, Feb. 29, 2008, available at http://www.churchtimes.co.uk/content.asp?id=52673.
30
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
31
Katie Zezima, Obey Same-Sex Marriage Law, Officials Told, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2004, at A15. Some
Massachusetts Justices of the Peace had previously announced they would resign if forced to perform
same-sex marriages. Kathleen Burge, Justices of the Peace Confront Gay Marriage, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr.
18, 2004, at B1.
32
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B § 5(c) (2010) (fining those who have “been adjudged to have
committed 2 or more discriminatory practices during the 7-year period ending on the date of the filing of
the complaint” as much as $50,000; “if the acts constituting the discriminatory practice that is the object of
the complaint are committed by the same natural person who has been previously adjudged to have
committed acts constituting a discriminatory practice,” the $50,000 fine can be imposed “without regard to
the period of time within which any subsequent discriminatory practice occurred”). In Connecticut, an
individual who violates the public accommodations provision of the anti-discrimination statute can be
jailed for up to thirty days. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a–81d(b) (2010).
33
763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
27
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....
The Court’s ruling applies everywhere in Iowa, in every county.
Recorders do not have discretion or power to ignore the Iowa Supreme
Court’s ruling.
. . . All county recorders in the state of Iowa are required to comply with
the Varnum decision following issuance of procedendo from the Supreme
Court, and to issue marriage licenses to same sex couples in the same
manner as licenses issued to opposite gender applicants.34
As if this were not emphatic enough, the Attorney General added: “[I]f necessary, we will
explore legal actions to enforce and implement the Court’s ruling, working with the Iowa
Depart. of Public Health and county attorneys.”35
¶16
The Iowa Attorney General’s blanket refusal to allow government officials to step
aside from facilitating same-sex marriages extends to judges as well. In Iowa, ethics
rules have been leveraged to squeeze out the discretion judges would otherwise have
about which marriage ceremonies to preside over. A spokesperson for Iowa’s Attorney
General cautioned that while “judges and magistrate judges have discretion whether . . .
to participate in wedding ceremonies . . . they should certainly do so without bias or
prejudice, as per the Code of Judicial Conduct.”36
¶17
Individuals have responded rationally to these strong signals. Because judges lack
the ability to refuse to perform same-sex marriages, even when others would gladly assist
a same-sex couple, at least one Iowa magistrate has stopped performing marriages
altogether.37 In Massachusetts,38 several Justices of the Peace said they would resign
because no exemption was available, and at least one did so.39
¶18
These experiences make clear that absent an exemption, government employees,
contractors, and officials who adhere to a traditional view of marriage, based on deeply
held religious beliefs about marriage, have two choices: refuse at peril to one’s own job
or violate their fundamental beliefs.40
34

Press Release, Iowa Dep’t Justice, Office Attorney Gen., Statement of Iowa Attorney General Tom
Miller—County Recorders Must Comply with Supreme Court’s Varnum Decision (Apr. 21, 2009),
available at http://www.state.ia.us/government/ag/latest_news/releases/apr_2009/Marrige_Stmnt.html.
35
Id.
36
See Kilian Melloy, Iowa Magistrate to Stop Performing Marriages, EDGE BOSTON, Apr. 23, 2009,
http://www.edgeboston.com/index.php?ch=news&sc=&sc2=news&sc3=&id=90310 (quoting Bob
Brammer, a spokesperson for Iowa’s Attorney General’s office).
37
See id.; Jason Clayworth, Iowa Judge to Stop Performing Marriages, DES MOINES REG., Apr. 23, 2009,
http://m.dmregister.com/news.jsp?key=449534. Magistrates in Iowa are authorized by law to preside over
weddings. IOWA CODE § 595.10(1) (2010).
38
Zezima, supra note 31 (discussing announcement from Governor’s chief counsel); Burge, supra note 31.
39
See Emily Shartin, Clerks in Suburbs Ready for May 17 Gay Marriages, BOSTON GLOBE, May 13, 2004,
at 1 (reporting that a Bellingham, Massachusetts Town Clerk, Kathleen Harvey, planned to resign her post
as Justice of the Peace “because she feels ‘uncomfortable’ about the prospect of performing same-sex
marriages”); Steve Inskeep, Mass. Justice of the Peace Resigns Over Gay Marriage (Nat’l Pub. Radio
broadcast May 14, 2004), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1896321
(indicating that a Charlton, Massachusetts Justice of the Peace, Linda Gray Kelley, “chose to resign her
post rather than perform gay marriages”).
40
Some have argued that a person can have a moral objection to an act that does not give rise to “a claim of
conscience to avoid participating.” See Kent Greenawalt, The Significance of Conscience, __ SAN DIEGO
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¶19

Some people see the religious objections of government employees as nothing
more than personal hang-ups that they should just get over:
[A] justice of the peace[’s] [“JOTP”] role is purely civil, not religious. As
a representative of the state, his role is to issue marriage licenses to those
qualified couples who request it and are qualified to marry under
Louisiana law. If he has moral objections to some couples, he should
resign as a JOTP, as a civil servant, if you can’t do your job, you resign.41
For these critics, religious liberty exemptions represent a “get out of jail free” card
authorizing discrimination.42 The proper way to resolve the conflict, the critics maintain,
is for the objector to quit:
Obviously goods and services to the general public should have no more
protections for bias against same sex weddings than they do for bias
against mixed race weddings. If their conscience bothers them, maybe
they are in the wrong business.43

¶20

This cavalier dismissal of religious objections overlooks the fact that allowing
government employees to step aside from facilitating same-sex marriage will cost samesex couples and the government itself very little, if anything, as Part III explains.44 This
L. REV. __ n.4 (forthcoming 2010) (giving as an example a nurse opposed to elective plastic surgery who
might nonetheless believe that “her moral duties as a nurse to do what she is asked actually outweigh any
negative moral aspect of her participation”).
41
Posting of Matthew in NYC to Right Across the Atlantic,
http://www.theatlanticright.com/2009/10/16/the-devils-advocate-checks-in-denying-marriage-services/
(Oct. 16, 2009) (discussing the Louisiana Justice of the Peace who refused on non-religious grounds to
marry an interracial couple and observing that “[t]he same would apply in Iowa, Massachusetts, Vermont
etc., if a JOTP can’t marry all legally qualified couples, including same-sex couples, s/he shouldn’t
continue as a JOTP”).
42
Religious Liberty Implications of D.C.’s Same-Sex Marriage Bill (18-482): Hearing before D.C. Council,
at 6:57:55, Nov. 2, 2009 (statement of Councilmember Catania), available at
http://oct.dc.gov/services/on_demand_video/channel13/november2009/11_02_09_JUDICI.asx (“If [an
objector is a clerk] who [chooses] not to provide [a] service that [she] ha[s] accepted the job to provide but
. . . still want[s] an entire salary as if [she] were providing 100% of the service, [then she is asking for] all
of the benefits of the position [while feeling] entitled to discriminate.”).
43
Comment by seller11, supra note 5. This view is shared by some persons in local government. The first
vice president of the Massachusetts Town Clerks’ Association, Judith St. Croix, a town clerk herself,
indicated in 2004 that “most clerks, regardless of their personal views, will follow the law . . . and ‘will do
their job.’ . . . She indicated that ‘[i]f they have a problem, then yes, they should resign.’” Shartin, supra
note 39, at 2. Although the charge of illegal “discrimination” or “bias” is a common refrain, applying
conclusory labels and telling objectors to “follow the law” is not helpful when the dialogue is about what
the law should be.
44
Others have also argued that forcing religious objectors to leave their jobs is a bad idea. See Letter from
Luke Goodrich, Legal Counsel, The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, to Office of Pub. Health and Sci.,
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., available at http://www.becketfund.org/files/ea888.pdf (arguing that
forcing conscientious objectors out of their jobs violates state and federal law, it excludes a certain segment
of the population from certain jobs purely on the grounds of moral or religious beliefs, it hurts long-serving
employees who did not foresee the changes when they first took the job, and it limits the pool of available
persons to do the work).
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stance also assumes that any refusal is motivated by gay animus.45 But for many people,
marriage is a religious institution and wedding ceremonies are a religious sacrament.46
For them, assisting with marriage ceremonies has a religious significance that
commercial services that are subject to non-discrimination bans, like ordering burgers
and hailing taxis, simply do not. Many of these people have no objection generally to
providing services to lesbians and gays, but they would object to directly facilitating a
same-sex marriage.
¶21
Perhaps most troubling, this intransigence discounts the harsh effect of telling
government employees to “pack up and get another job.” Many of these employees
could never have imagined when they took their jobs that they would be asked to
facilitate a same-sex marriage. Consider the seventy-year-old marriage commissioner in
Saskatchewan, Canada, a public official who had married couples since 1983. He was
fined $2500 by the provincial Human Rights Tribunal when he refused to perform a
marriage ceremony for a same-sex couple, citing his religious beliefs.47 On appeal, the
Court of Queens Bench held that even though the marriage took place, the objecting
commissioner had discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation when he considered
“his personal religious views when performing his public functions.”48
¶22
Like the Saskatchewan commissioner, many state employees in the United States
began working for the government well before same-sex marriage was recognized
anywhere in the world. First recognized in 2001 by the Netherlands, same-sex marriage
did not find acceptance in any U.S. jurisdiction until 2004, when Massachusetts began
issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples.49 A Council of State Governments report
shows that many government employees worked in the public sector for decades before
same-sex marriage became a legal possibility. Consider the handful of states that
recognize same-sex marriage and also provide data on the percentage of state employees
who were eligible for retirement in 2002.50 Generally, to be eligible for retirement, an
employee must have worked for a substantial length of time.51 In California and Maine,
for example, which legally recognized same-sex marriage only to later have it repealed,52
45

See supra notes 3, 5–6 and accompanying text.
Charles J. Reid, Jr., Marriage: Its Relationship to Religion, Law, and the State, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 7, at 157–67 (arguing that historical understandings of marriage were
grounded in the notion that it is a “divine institution”).
47
Nichols v. M.J., 2009 SQKB S09F0132 (Queen’s Bench for Saskatchewan 2009); Service Club Pledges
Support, LEADER-POST (REGINA), Apr. 17, 2007, available at
http://www.canada.com/reginaleaderpost/news/sports/story.html?id=ab7789c1-5988-421d-bd3b1ade424e87b1. Although the commissioner was not a government employee and received no pay from the
government, he performed a public function.
48
Nichols, supra note 47.
49
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); Carolyn Lochhead, Pivotal Day for
Gay Marriage in U.S. Nears, S.F. CHRONICLE, May 2, 2004, at A1, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2004/05/02/MARRIAGE.TMP.
50
JAMES B. CARROLL & DAVID A. MOSS, COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, STATE EMPLOYEE WORKER
SHORTAGE: THE IMPENDING CRISIS 16 (Oct. 2002), available at
http://www.csg.org/knowledgecenter/docs/TA0210WorkShortage.pdf; Press Release, Conn. Comm’n on
Aging, Commission in Aging’s Workplace Flexibility Proposal Advances; Agency Estimates Potential
Annual State Savings of $22 Million (undated), available at
http://www.cga.ct.gov/coa/PDFs/News%20Releases/WorkplaceFlexiblitynewsrelease.pdf. Numbers for
Massachusetts are not available.
51
See infra note 66 (discussing length of service requirements for retirement).
52
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5; An Act to End Discrimination in Civil Marriage and Affirm Religious
46
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roughly fifty percent of government employees were eligible for retirement in 2002.53 In
Connecticut, which first recognized same-sex marriage by judicial decision but later
enacted a same-sex marriage law,54 seventeen percent of public employees were
retirement-eligible as of 2002. Roughly one in every four or five employees working for
the government in Iowa (seventeen percent),55 New Hampshire (twenty-two percent),56
and Vermont (twenty-five percent)57 already qualify for retirement. There is no reason to
think that clerks in state registrar offices or other employees as a group are more likely to
be newcomers to the job than their counterparts.
¶23
Because of their long tenure in these jobs, many government employees simply
could not have anticipated when they took their jobs that facilitating same-sex marriages
would be part of their duties.58 On average, workers in Iowa had worked thirteen years
by 2002, in New Hampshire nine years, and in Vermont eleven years—all more than a
decade before same-sex marriage was recognized by their state.59 For those far into their
work lives, moving to other employment may be impractical or even impossible.60
¶24
Dismissal will likely also be very costly to the religious objectors.61 A job in the
state licensure office pays well,62 especially in light of the qualifications required. Many
clerk positions require only a high school diploma.63 These jobs provide generous
Freedom, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 650 (repealed 2009). But see Ashby Jones, Calif. Supremes
Decline to Order Officials to Defend Prop. 8, WALL STREET J., Sept. 9, 2010, available at
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/09/09/calif-supremes-decline-to-order-officials-to-defend-prop-8 (discussing
the murky status of Proposition 8, after being struck down by a Federal Judge as unconstitutional).
53
CARROLL & MOSS, supra note 50, at 16.
54
Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); An Act Implementing the Guarantee of
Equal Protection under the Constitution of the State for Same Sex Couples, 2009 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 0913.
55
CARROLL & MOSS, supra note 50, at 16.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
While these employees would recognize that their positions as public servants involve serving the public,
Part V documents a long and rich tradition permitting government employees in certain circumstances to
continue in their roles without performing services that violate deeply held religious beliefs. See infra Part
V (discussing protections provided by Title VII).
59
CARROLL & MOSS, supra note 50, at 17 (providing average years of service as of 2002 for state
employees in select states).
60
Id. (reporting an average age for state employees in Iowa, New Hampshire, and Vermont as forty-six,
forty-three, and forty-three, respectively); see also Maria Mallory, Age Discrimination Pervades, Difficult
to Prove, Experts Say, TRIB. BUS. NEWS, Jan. 9, 2000.
61
As Professor Brownstein notes, it may be possible for religious objectors to same-sex marriage to obey
their “religious obligations without incurring . . . serious burdens” like dismissal—for example, by seeking
a transfer to another department as contemplated by Title VII. Brownstein, supra note 15, at 24. See also
infra Part V for a discussion of transfers and other accommodations under Title VII.
62
A July 2008 report of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics indicates that the median annual salary for local
government clerks is $49,414. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, CAREER GUIDE TO
INDUSTRIES tbl.4 (2010–11), available at http://www.bls.gov/oco/cg/cgs042.htm. That compensation
exceeds mean annual wages for all occupations ($42,270) and is higher than the compensation for
“community and social services occupations” ($41,790), “education, training and library occupations”
($48,460), “healthcare support occupations” ($26,340), “protective service occupants” ($40,200), and many
others. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, May 2008 National Occupational Employment and
Wage Estimates, http://www.bls.gov/oes/2008/may/oes_nat.htm#b00-0000 (last visited Sept. 3, 2010)
(using means rather than medians and combining court and license clerks with municipal clerks, which
does not allow for precise, “apples to apples” comparisons).
63
The International Institute of Municipal Clerks (IIMC) indicates that qualifications vary from
municipality to municipality. IIMC’s certification program gives points for having completed a bachelor’s
or master's degree which suggests that college is not an absolute qualification. See Int’l Inst. Mun. Clerks,
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healthcare, retirement, and other benefits, in addition to competitive salaries.64 Jobs with
benefits and long-term job security are not easily replaced in this economy. And for the
religious objector who is the primary breadwinner for her household, the objector must
also weigh the costs to her family as well.65
¶25
Dismissal is likely to be costly to objectors in other ways, too. Many long-time
employees have built up retirement and other benefits that would be wiped out or
significantly curtailed if they exit rather than violate a religious conviction. The
Massachusetts State Retirement Plan (SERS) illustrates precisely what is at stake for
employees who are unable to continue in their roles without accommodation.
Massachusetts state and local government employees must participate in SERS if they
work full-time or half-time with benefits. A defined benefit program, SERS pays in lieu
of Social Security. New employees contribute 9% of their gross salary to SERS, while
employees making over $30,000 contribute 11% of salary, both of which are federal taxdeferred after a deduction of 1.45% for the Medicare portion of Social Security.66 State
Educational Guidelines: Mission Statement (2010), available at
http://www.iimc.com/DocumentView.aspx?DID=527.
64
See infra note 65–68 (discussing retirement benefits).
65
See Michael Luo, Job Woes Exacting a Toll on Family Life, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2009, at A1, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/12/us/12families.html?_r=1 (noting studies that have tied drops in
family income to negative effects on children’s development).
66
See Univ. of Mass., Human Resources: Retirement Plans,
http://www.massachusetts.edu/hr/retirement.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2010).
In Vermont, employees may receive an early retirement after fifty-five if they have five years of
creditable service, but the size of the payment shrinks under a complex formula the earlier an employee
retires. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24 § 5055(c)–(d) (2010) (“Early retirement. Any member who has not
reached his or her normal retirement date but who has completed five years of creditable service, at least
two and one-half of which have been as a contributor subsequent to joining the system, and who has
attained age 55 may retire on an early retirement allowance. Early retirement allowance. Upon early
retirement, a member shall receive an early retirement allowance equal to the retirement benefit reduced by
one-half of one percent for each of the first 120 months, one-sixth of one percent for each of the next 120
months, one-eighteenth of one percent for each of the next 120 months and one fifty-fourth of one percent
for each additional month that the member is under the normal age at the time of early retirement.”).
In Connecticut, an employee “with 5 years of continuous active service” may retire at any age but the
retirement benefit is “actuarially reduced” the farther away the employee is from 55. See RETIREMENT &
BENEFIT SERV. DIV., CONN. MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYS. UNIT, CONNECTICUT MUNICIPAL
EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM: SUMMARY PLAN DESCRIPTION 8 (July 2007), available at
http://www.osc.state.ct.us/rbsd/cmers/plandoc/MERFSPD7107.pdf (“You are eligible for Normal
Retirement if: You have attained age 55 with a CMERS participating municipality OR You have not
attained age 55, but you have a total of 25 years of service, inclusive of aggregate service, consisting of at
least 5 years of continuous active service or 15 years of non-continuous active service with a CMERS
participating municipality . . . . You are eligible for reduced early retirement benefits, regardless of your
age, if you have completed at least 5 years of continuous active service with a CMERS participating
municipality. Your retirement benefit is actuarially reduced in order to account for the probability of a
longer payout period resulting from your early retirement. The amount of the reduction depends on how
far away you are from age 55.”). See also Office of State Comptroller, State of Connecticut, Early
Retirement Factors Fact Sheet, http://www.osc.state.ct.us/rbsd/cmers/plandoc/ERetFact.pdf (last visited
Sept. 3, 2010) (providing percentages of salary received by early retirees).
In New Hampshire, “service retirement” is available to active employees age sixty or older with no
minimum service required, with the pension equal to the employee’s average final compensation (taken
from their “three highest-paid years of membership service”) “divided by 60 multiplied by creditable
service.” New Hampshire Retirement System, Members: Service Credit,
http://www.nhrs.org/members/serviceCredit.aspx (last visited Aug. 20, 2010). An employee is eligible for
early retirement with 10 years of creditable service if they are 50–59, or if younger and have amassed 20
years of creditable service and their age plus service equals 70 years. New Hampshire Retirement System,
Members: Early Service Retirement, http://www.nhrs.org/members/earlyretirement.aspx (last visited Aug.

330

Vol. 5:2]

Robin Fretwell Wilson

employees can draw a pension at age fifty-five if they have ten years of full-time service.
They may also draw a pension at any age after twenty years of full-time service.
¶26
The percentage of salary a retiree receives depends on their age and years of service
at the time of exit.67 An employee who leaves employment before accruing ten years of
service sees any retirement she would have collected vanish. But even longer-term
employees take a hit if they leave their job rather than violate their religious beliefs. An
employee who exits after ten years of service, at age fifty-five, receives fifteen percent of
their highest three years of consecutive pay. But had the employee continued in their role
for another ten years, and retired at sixty-five, they would have received twenty-five
percent.68
¶27
At the very least, these costs to individuals who have seen the social and moral
landscape shift beneath them suggest that employees who worked in state licensure
offices prior to recognition of same-sex marriage should be grandfathered in. The
equities particularly favor grandfathering existing employees because, as Part III.B
explains, giving an exemption is relatively costless to the government and other
employees, and because the exemption imposes no hardship on same-sex couples, as Part
III.A shows. Grandfathering these employees recognizes their settled expectations69 and
acknowledges just how harsh the penalty for religious objection will be for many.
¶28
Although the case for exempting new hires is less compelling, the small number of
predicted collisions between an employee’s religious convictions and the demands of the
job also favors an exemption. As the next part explains, meaningful religious liberty
exemptions for employees, both new and old, would allow them to have valuable
opportunities for public employment without harming same-sex couples.
III. THE COST OF ACCOMMODATIONS
¶29

I and a number of religious liberty scholars have argued for a “hardship” exemption
that balances two competing concerns: marriage equality and religious liberty.70 This
20, 2010).
In Iowa, a “vested” employee may take early retirement if they have reached age 55. The Early
Retirement monthly allowance shrinks by 0.25 percentage points for each month before normal retirement
age (based on age and years of service). This early retirement adjustment does not apply if you qualify for
normal or disability retirement, or if you retire under the Special Service formula.
Normal retirement age occurs upon the earlier of: (a) Age 65, (b) Age 62 with 20 or more years of
covered employment (62/20), or (c) When years of service plus the employee’s age equals or exceeds 88.
IOWA PUB. EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYS., MEMBER HANDBOOK: SUMMARY OF IPERS RETIREMENT PLAN
42 (May 2009), available at http://www.ipers.org/publications/members/pdf/memberhandbook.pdf.
67
See University of Massachusetts, Massachusetts Group 1 Retirement Percentage Chart,
http://media.umassp.edu/massedu/hr/Retirementchart%20(2).pdf (last visited Sept. 3, 2010).
68
Id. An employee of twenty years who leaves employment receives twenty percent. Had they continued
working until sixty-five, this percentage would leap to fifty percent. An employee who has worked for the
state for forty years and has reached sixty-five receives eighty percent.
69
See Steven Shavell, On Optimal Legal Change, Past Behavior, and Grandfathering, 37 J. LEGAL STUD.
37, 38 (2008) (arguing that grandfathering—“allowing noncompliance for parties already participating in
an activity and complying with rules in the past”—should often be employed).
70
Two groups of legal scholars have worked in tandem to craft and advocate for the proposed Marriage
Conscience Protection. One group consists of myself together with Thomas C. Berg of the University of
St. Thomas School of Law (Minnesota), Carl H. Esbeck of the University of Missouri School of Law,
Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr. of Valparaiso University School of Law, Richard W. Garnett of the
University of Notre Dame Law School, and Marc D. Stern, Acting Co-Executive Director/General Counsel
of the American Jewish Congress. See Letter to Chet Culver, supra note 7, at 11 n.36 (regarding Religious
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exemption serves the important purpose of clarifying where one person’s rights end and
another’s begin. This part first walks through the mechanics of the proposed hardship
exemption, illustrating that same-sex couples would not bear the cost of another’s
religious convictions. Using the real world experience of marriage licensure offices in
Massachusetts, this part argues that an exemption would impose at most a scant burden
on the government or an objector’s co-workers.
A. No Hardship to Same-Sex Couples
¶30

The proposed accommodation for which I and others have advocated, the
“Marriage Conscience Protection,” contained in Appendix B, would provide in relevant
part:
(b) Individuals and small businesses protected.
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (b)(2), no individual, sole
proprietor, or small business shall be required
(A) to provide goods or services that assist or promote the
solemnization or celebration of any marriage, or provide
counseling or other services that directly facilitate the perpetuation
of any marriage;
....
(C) . . . if providing such goods, services, benefits, or housing
would cause such individuals or sole proprietors, or owners of such
small businesses, to violate their sincerely held religious beliefs.
(2) Paragraph (b)(1) shall not apply if
....
(B) in the case of an individual who is a government employee or
official, if another government employee or official is not promptly
available and willing to provide the requested government service
without inconvenience or delay.71

Conscience and Same-Sex Marriage in Iowa and giving academic and organizational affiliations for
identification purposes only, and noting that the universities and organizations that employ the signers take
no position on these issues) (on file with author). The second group, led by Douglas Laycock of the
University of Michigan School of Law, consists of Andrew Koppelman of Northwestern University Law
School, Michael Perry of Emory University School of Law, and Marc D. Stern, Acting Co-Executive
Director/General Counsel of the American Jewish Cong. See Letter from Robin Fretwell Wilson et al., to
Sen. Richard James Codey, New Jersey 3 (Dec. 5, 2009) (on file with author) (regarding Religious Liberty
Implications of Same-Sex Marriage and noting that each signer signed in their individual capacity and no
university or organization takes a position on the issues addressed in the letter).
71
Letter from Thomas C. Berg, Carl H. Esbeck, Richard W. Garnett & Robin Fretwell Wilson to Sen. Paul
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¶31

This provision addresses government employees who process the paperwork
necessary to marry, issue the license, or preside over the civil ceremony. (Elsewhere I
have addressed exemptions for sole proprietors or small businesses, such as the wedding
photographer or flower shop.72)
¶32
The proposed Marriage Conscience Protection allows government employees or
officials who serve in ministerial or ceremonial roles to refuse to provide a service only if
another willing provider is available. In this way, the proposed Marriage Conscience
Protection does not permit a government clerk to act as a chokepoint on the path to
marriage for same-sex couples.
¶33
Many commentators are rightly concerned about conferring upon religious
objectors an absolute, unqualified exemption to facilitating same-sex marriage.
Professors Lupu and Tuttle, for instance, observe elsewhere in this volume that:
[T]he political community has a legitimate interest in ensuring that all
people have equal access to publicly available goods and services, whether
provided by the state, commercial entities, or others. This interest
primarily arises from concern about those who are excluded from such
benefits. Exclusion may imperil health and safety, limit opportunities for
personal development, deny political and social equality, or impose
psychic distress. State policies protecting against such exclusion also
express the political community’s concerns about its own character and
experience, because such exclusion may result in segregation and
conflict.73
The Marriage Conscience Protection proposed here is not an absolute exemption for
government employees, nor have I proposed such unfettered discretion in the past.74
A. Sarlo, New Jersey (Dec. 2, 2009), available at http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/nj_ltr.doc.
72
See Wilson, Matters of Conscience, supra note 18, at 100–102; Robin Fretwell Wilson, Same-Sex
Marriage and Religious Liberty: Life After Prop 8, 14 NEXUS 101 (2009).
73
Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 2, at 280–81 (emphasis added).
74
In an early work of mine to which Professors Lupu and Tuttle are responding, I argued that “one way to
balance competing moral claims is to limit the ability to refuse to instances where a hardship will not
occur.” See Wilson, Matters of Conscience, supra note 18, at 99. I specifically noted, “if the objector is
the only celebrant available, the denial is tantamount to a denial of access to marriage, . . . a good
guaranteed by the Constitution.” Id. at 99–100. Recognizing “the unique constitutional status of
marriage,” I concluded that states seeking to provide an accommodation to government employees would
“face a choice—bar conscientious refusals entirely or provide a hardship exemption to the ability of the
objecting clerk to refuse.” Id. at 100.
Even as to objectors who could not act as a roadblock to marriage, such as those who provide
commercial services in the marketplace (i.e., bakers), I argued for a hardship exemption, namely, “the
ability to refuse based on religious or moral objections, but limit[ed] . . . to instances where a significant
hardship to the requesting parties will not occur.” Id. at 101.
Professors Lupu and Tuttle understand that the hardship exemption that I sketched in my earlier work,
which forms the backbone for this Article, is bounded by hardship to same-sex couples. As they explain,
“Under such a regime, religious objectors would be exempted from a duty to serve same-sex couples,
unless a specific refusal of service would impose a ‘significant hardship’ on those seeking the service.”
Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 2, at 288 (critiquing the “scholarly works of Wilson and Laycock”).
Nonetheless, they tag exemptions qualified by hardship as denying access to marriage:
Because the state creates this benefit, [marriage], denial of access to marriage has a very
different character from the state’s denial of funding for, or other restrictions on, abortion
services.
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¶34

Indeed, the conditional nature of the proposed Marriage Conscience Protection is
by deliberate design: an absolute exemption for government employees or officials—
unqualified by hardship—could erect a roadblock to marriage for same-sex couples, at
least some of the time. For example, an accommodation that absolutely exempts clerks
from processing an application for a marriage license would hobble a couple’s access in a
number of foreseeable circumstances. This might occur when a solitary clerk is available
in a hundred mile radius and he or she objects for religious reasons to facilitating a samesex marriage. An absolute roadblock would also be erected when an otherwise willing
clerk is unavailable due to illness or other reason, leaving no other willing clerk to assist
the couple. The proposed Marriage Conscience Protection forestalls such hardships to
same-sex couples.75
¶35
As with any rule that seeks to balance two competing interests, the proposed
hardship exemption will involve some line drawing; specifically, what will count as
“promptly” or “inconvenience” or “delay.” Such line drawing is best left to the
legislative process since different states may want to make different choices depending
on the facts on the ground in that state; for instance, how rural or urban the state is, how
many state offices process the necessary paperwork, or the length of the requisite waiting
period to marry in that state. Such waiting periods vary significantly from state to state.76
¶36
That said, asking same-sex couples to wait several days for a license that
heterosexual couples would receive the same day would not be “prompt.” State
legislators may want to take the mandatory waiting period in their own jurisdiction as a
guide for deciding what is “prompt.”77 Of course, one can imagine that some legislatures
will choose to enact legislation without explicitly defining certain terms, such as
“prompt,” as they routinely do in other statutes—and leave it to the courts to construe
those terms.
¶37
To be clear, the proposed Marriage Conscience Protection will strike many
religious objectors as cold comfort. This is so because in a straight-up contest between
religious liberty and marriage equality, religious liberty yields under this construction.
Cabining the ability to object to only those situations when no hardship for same-sex
couples would result is principled: the state should not confer the right to marry with one

...
Thus, under both the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment, and related equality
provisions of state constitutions, such state officers have duties of equal respect to all persons
within the state. It is very difficult to see how one can square such a duty with a right, religionbased or otherwise, to refuse to provide public services to a particular class of individuals.
Id. at 293-94 (emphasis added).
As I explain in the text of this Article, I share Professors Lupu and Tuttle’s concerns about erecting any
absolute roadblock to marriage.
75
By avoiding such hardships to same-sex couples, the proposed Marriage Conscience Protection should
survive challenges that it violates the fundamental right to marry as well. See infra Part IV (discussing the
U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on marriage restrictions).
76
Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-220 (2006) (“No marriage license may be issued unless a written
application has been filed . . . at least twenty-four hours before the issuance of the license.”), with WIS.
STAT. § 765.08 (2007) (“No marriage license may be issued within 5 days of application for the marriage
license.”).
77
States could also enact different waiting periods for same-sex couples to place them “in the same position
in term[s] of access to marriage.” See Wilson, Matters of Conscience, supra note 18, at 99.
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hand and then take it back with the other by enacting broad, unqualified religious
objections that could operate to bar same-sex couples from marrying.
¶38
While the proposed Marriage Conscience Protection does not help every objector in
every instance, the exemption still has value. As the next subpart illustrates, a hardship
exemption likely will allow the vast majority of objectors to step aside.78
It is worth noting that the proposed Marriage Conscience Protection makes no distinction
among marriages to which a religious objector may object. In this sense, it does not
distinguish on the basis of sexual orientation. A religious liberty exemption that permits
objections only to same-sex marriages would raise a number of concerns, including
whether it makes an impermissible classification on the basis of sexual orientation.79 Of
course, it is possible that government employees might seek to step aside from facilitating
other kinds of marriage on religious grounds—such as a second marriage or even an
interracial marriage. It is unlikely, however, that the proposed Marriage Conscience
Protection will release a floodgate of religious objections to a variety of marriages, since
after Loving v. Virginia only two documented cases of a clerk or judge refusing to issue a
marriage license to an interracial couple can be found.80 Given the paucity of religious
objections to facilitating marriages before the recognition of same-sex marriage, it seems
preferable to not limit the proposed exemption only to same-sex marriage.81
B. Minimal Burden on the Government or Co-workers
¶39

Of course, exemptions may be costly not only to couples applying for licenses, but
to the government office as employer or to an objector’s co-workers.82 Yet a new study
by the Williams Institute at the University of California at Los Angeles suggests that any
exemption is likely to be easily accommodated at minimal cost. In Massachusetts, which
has had the longest experience with same-sex marriage in the United States, same-sex
marriage licenses comprise a small fraction of the office’s total work. As Table 1 shows,
in 2004, the first year that Massachusetts issued same-sex marriage licenses it
78

See infra Part III.B (arguing that few cases of hardship to same-sex couples would actually arise).
See, e.g., Wilson, The Calculus of Accommodation, supra note 16, at Part VI (discussing § 40-406(e) of
the D.C. Council’s proposed same-sex marriage statute, which would have provided that “a religious
society, or a nonprofit organization which is operated, supervised, or controlled by or in conjunction with a
religious society, shall not be required to provide services, accommodations, facilities, or goods for a
purpose related to the solemnization or celebration of a same-sex marriage, or the promotion of same-sex
marriage through religious programs, counseling, courses, or retreats, that is in violation of the religious
society’s beliefs”). Cf. Martha Minow, Should Religious Groups Be Exempt from Civil Rights Laws?, 48
B.C. L. REV. 781, 786 (2007) (introducing many of the complications that arise when religious groups seek
exemptions to civil rights laws).
80
See Wilson, Matters of Conscience, supra note 18, at 96 n.191 (reporting that as of 2008, there were “no
[judicial] cases after Loving v. Virginia in which clerks refused to issue licenses to, or judges refused to
marry, interracial couples” but finding that a 1994 news story reported that an interracial couple threatened
to sue Chester County, Tennessee, when county officials refused to marry them). The second instance
occurred more recently when a Louisiana Justice of the Peace refused to issue a marriage license to an
interracial couple, although the refusal was not based on religious grounds. Interracial Couple Denied
Marriage License By Louisiana Justice of the Peace, MSNBC.COM, Oct. 15, 2009,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/33332436/.
81
Legislators may worry that the proposed exemption would authorize a government employee to refuse to
assist an interracial couple, citing religious objections. Although past experience suggests such refusals
may be rare, legislators concerned about this possibility may wish explicitly to bar objections to facilitating
interracial marriages, in keeping with other legislative efforts to erase racial distinctions.
82
See infra Part V (discussing the requirements of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
79
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experienced a burst of requests from same-sex couples. Over a 7.5 month period these
requests totaled 6121, or 18.37% of all licenses issued by the Commonwealth that year.
Since 2004, the rate of same-sex marriage license requests has flattened out to a level that
likely approximates the year-in, year-out demand. “In 2005, 2006, 2007 and the first nine
months of 2008, there were 6,236 gay weddings, according to statistics from the state
Department of Public Health.”83
Table 184
Year
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Total

Opposite Sex
27,196
37,447
36,550
36,373
20,070
159,636

Same-Sex
6121
2060
1442
1524
1210
12,177

Total
33,317
39,507
37,993
37,897
23,292
172,006

Percentage
18.37
5.21
3.80
4.02
5.19
7.08

¶40

Presumably, the spike in 2004 applications represents both pent-up demand from
Massachusetts same-sex couples who previously were locked out of marriage and a firstin-time bump resulting from out-of-state couples who flocked to Massachusetts as a “gay
marriage Mecca.”85 Because five states now recognize same-sex marriage, and because
same-sex marriage has now been recognized for half a decade in Massachusetts, one
would expect the numbers of same-sex marriage applications to flatten out, as they have.
This stabilized demand suggests that staffing around a religious objection may indeed not
be very taxing on either the clerk’s office as an entity or a religious objector’s coworkers.86 As a fraction of all marriage license requests across the state, same-sex
marriage license requests fluctuated between 3.8 and 5.21% a year from 2005 to 2008.87
¶41
Indeed, the Williams Institute found that “most of the Commonwealth’s 351
communities have recorded same-sex marriages in the single digits since that first
year.”88 This is borne out by the statistics compiled by the Williams Institute for the
number of same-sex license requests in four Massachusetts communities: Northampton,
Springfield, West Springfield, and Westfield, shown in Table 2.

83

Pat Cahill, 5 Years After Same-Sex Marriage Became Legal in Massachusetts, Studies Find Economic
Benefit, THE REPUBLICAN, May 30, 2009, available at
http://www.masslive.com/news/index.ssf/2009/05/5_years_after_samesex_marriage.html.
84
Id.
85
Id. One possible low-cost solution is to allow objectors to take accumulated vacation in periods of pentup demand, reducing the number of collisions between the religious objector and the new demands placed
upon the clerk’s office. Obviously, this short-term solution will not solve every problem but may
significantly reduce their frequency at a time of predictably high demand.
86
See infra Part V (discussing the requirements of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
87
Cahill, supra note 83 (reporting statistics for 2008 through September only).
88
Id.
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Table 289

Town
Northampton
Springfield
West
Springfield
Westfield

2004(samesex/total)
338/469
85/845
10/177

2005(samesex/total)
78/336
22/884
7/181

2006(samesex/total)
104/258
23/870
3/168

2007(samesex/total)
91/306
35/846
5/139

2008(samesex/total)
n/a
58/n/a
3/n/a

15/295

4/249

4/265

8/255

5/n/a

¶42

Of those four, Northampton’s office was the busiest, averaging 91 requests per year
from 2005 through 2007. An employee in the Northampton Clerk’s Office suggested that
the number of same-sex marriage license requests is high in that city due to its reputation
as being “very accepting” and friendly to the lesbian and gay community.90 By contrast,
Springfield averaged considerably fewer, only 34.5 requests per year between 2005 and
2008, while West Springfield and Westfield averaged a mere 4.5 and 5.25 requests per
year, respectively. These statistics suggest that at the high end, an office is likely to
process no more than two same-sex license requests in a given week,91 while at the low
end, most offices will not have a single same-sex license request in any given week.92
¶43
Localities in Massachusetts staff the clerk’s office with a varying number of
employees. Of the communities referenced in Table 2, Northampton has three employees
in the clerk’s office capable of handling marriage license requests,93 while West
Springfield has four,94 Westfield three,95 and Springfield eleven.96 Northampton is the
office with the greatest likelihood of a collision between an objector and a same-sex
couple, with an average of ninety-one requests a year spread across only three employees.
But this office does not process marriage license requests on the spot,97 making it feasible
to direct the couple in advance to see a non-objecting clerk when they come in, reducing
the chance of a collision.
¶44
Moreover, there is good reason to believe that religious objectors will be few and
far between. The people who feel compelled to seek a religious accommodation
presumably hold two beliefs: one, a religious objection to same-sex marriage, and two,
the belief that facilitation itself makes one culpable. After California’s Proposition 8, a
89

Id.
Telephone Interview by Joe Mercer, Research Assistant, with Lynn Simmons, Northampton Clerk’s
Office (Jan. 14, 2010) [hereinafter Northampton Clerk’s Office Interview]. The community stopped
distinguishing same-sex from other marriages in 2008.
91
This estimate uses the average from Northampton. The Northampton Clerk’s Office is open fifty-two
weeks per year. Interview with Sissy Horrigan, Northampton City Clerk (Jan. 14, 2010).
92
Using the averages from Westfield and West Springfield.
93
Northampton Clerk’s Office Interview, supra note 90.
94
Telephone Interview by Joe Mercer with Otto Frizelle, West Springfield Clerk’s Office (Jan. 14, 2010)
[hereinafter West Springfield Clerk’s Office Interview].
95
Telephone Interview by Joe Mercer with Karen Fanion, Westfield City Clerk (Jan. 14, 2010).
96
Telephone interview by Steve Mammarella with Springfield City Hall Clerk Chantal Keating (Sep. 15,
2010).
97
Northampton requires a preliminary visit or phone call prior to receiving the license. Northampton
Clerk’s Office Interview, supra note 90. Of the five offices contacted, no other appears to use this process.
90
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poll by the Pew Forum found that forty-four percent of people believed that
homosexuality is either morally acceptable or that it is not a moral issue at all, while
forty-nine percent indicated it is morally wrong. Eleven percent of those who believed
that homosexuality is morally wrong still favored same-sex marriage.98 Fifty-three
percent of all respondents were opposed to same-sex marriage, but a clear majority, fiftyseven percent, supported giving same-sex couples the right to enter into civil unions.99
Presumably, those who believe same-sex relationships are acceptable or not a moral
issue, or who support same-sex marriage rights, are unlikely to have a religious objection
to facilitating a same-sex marriage.100 Other polling by the Pew Forum on the role of
religion in determining how a voter voted on Proposition 8 suggests that individuals
“who say they attend worship services at least once a week [were] much more likely to
oppose same-sex marriage (sixty-nine percent) than those who say they attend less often
(forty-five percent).”101 Generally, individuals with this degree of religious participation
comprise a distinct minority in the United States.102
¶45
Office staffing also influences whether religious objections are likely to occur—
that is, the religious objector will not always be the clerk to whom a same-sex couple first
presents. Assume that an office has eleven clerks and does not streamline applicants or
otherwise manage the workflow. If a same-sex couple is just as likely to present to any
given clerk as to any other, the probability that the couple approaches any objector by
chance is approximately 9.1% if the office contains a single religious objector.103 On the
other hand, in an office with two clerks, one of whom is an objector, the probability that
the couple approaches the objector by chance is fifty percent.104
¶46
The idea of exemptions rankles critics not only because they assume that
exemptions will be costly but because of concerns about fairness105—namely, the
possibility that the objector somehow receives a better deal than her co-workers. All of
the clerk’s offices contacted in connection with this Article described the volume of work
in their office as very high. Work is spread across all the available personnel with no one
having any real down-time.106 Because these offices are operating near maximum
98

PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, MAJORITY CONTINUES TO SUPPORT CIVIL UNIONS: MOST
STILL OPPOSE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (Oct. 2009), http://pewforum.org/docs/?DocID=481.
99
Id.
100
Notably, younger respondents, 58%, favored same-sex marriage. Id. (reporting support for same-sex
marriage among 18–29 year-olds).
101
DAVID MASCI, PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, PUBLIC OPINION ON GAY MARRIAGE:
OPPONENTS CONSISTENTLY OUTNUMBER SUPPORTERS (July 2009), http://pewforum.org/docs/?DocID=424.
See also Poll: Calif. Gay Marriage Ban Driven by Religion, USA TODAY, Dec. 4, 2008,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/religion/2008-12-04-gay-poll_N.htm (reporting that along with economic
status, “religious convictions played a greater role than race and age in determining” whether a voter
supported California’s Proposition 8).
102
“A quarter (27%) of adult Americans claim that they attend church once a week or more often.” Press
Release, Harris Interactive, More Americans Believe in the Devil, Hell and Angels than in Darwin’s
Theory of Evolution (Dec. 10, 2008), http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=982.
103
Obviously, the probabilities increase if other clerks would also object.
104
According to an employee in the Northampton Clerk’s Office, same-sex couples gravitate to the
Northampton office when they have a choice because the office is seen as gay-friendly. Northampton
Clerk’s Office Interview, supra note 90. Compare 2004 applications in Table 2.
105
See supra note 42 (quoting Councilman David Catania).
106
Clerks in the Northampton Clerk’s Office also process birth records, marriage records, death records,
business certifications, physician registrations, dog licenses, fishing and game licenses, and handle
elections. Telephone Interview with Wendy Mazza, Northampton Town Clerk (Jan. 12, 2010). Clerks in
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capacity, an objector who passes a same-sex license request onto a co-worker will have to
move immediately to other work.107 In effect, the objector swaps one assignment, the
same-sex marriage license application, for the next piece of work that must be done.
Thus, the co-worker covering the same-sex marriage application is not forced to shoulder
additional responsibilities.108 In this way, objectors will not be “rewarded” for their
religious objection with a lighter workload.109 Moreover, because there is no reduced
workload reward for maintaining a religious objection, insincere objectors will have no
incentive to seek an exemption. All in all, allowing a religious objector to step aside
from facilitating same-sex marriage licenses should not be very taxing to the office or the
objector’s co-workers, because there will be very few instances in any year where one
employee will have to cover for another. The number of collisions should be so small as
to be unproblematic.
IV. BURDENING MARRIAGE
¶47

Some assert that:
[U]nder both the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment, and
related equality provisions of state constitutions, [all executive and
judicial] state officers have duties of equal respect to all persons within the
state. It is very difficult to see how one can square such a duty with a
right, religion-based or otherwise, to refuse to provide public services to a
particular class of individuals.110

¶48

Because state officers issue licenses to marry, this position seems to assert that
religious exemptions to same-sex marriage laws would impermissibly burden a same-sex

the West Springfield and Westfield Clerk’s Office handle marriage licenses and perform the other clerical
responsibilities. Email from Diane Foley, City Clerk, Springfield, Massachusetts to Joseph Mercer (Jan.
12, 2010); Email from Karen M. Fanion, City Clerk, Westfield, Massachusetts to Joseph Mercer (Jan. 12,
2010).
107
While the clerks contacted in connection with this Article did not quantify the number of licenses
processed by religious objectors versus their co-workers, they did indicate that all employees were being
fully utilized.
108
Eugene Volokh, Intermediate Questions of Religious Exemptions—A Research Agenda with Test Suites,
21 CARDOZO L. REV. 595, 608 (1999) (discussing U.S. Supreme Court cases that arguably suggest that “the
Establishment Clause may impose another limitation on religious exemptions—‘In accommodating
religious activities, the legislature should not impose disproportionate costs on other citizens or
activities.’”).
Additional workload may not be the only cost to co-workers. A “covering” co-worker might resent the
fact that she is performing a task that the objector would otherwise have performed, despite the fact that
both are being fully utilized. See supra note 21 (discussing feelings of “victimization” reported by coworkers in Ladele v. London Borough of Islington). If such feelings, without more, rise to the level of an
impermissible hardship on co-workers, as discussed in Part V, query whether the law would ever permit a
religious exemption allowing an employee to decline to perform a task she would otherwise perform.
109
Contrast the quip made by many waiters and waitresses who “started smoking to get the extra breaks.”
110
Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 2, at 294.
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couple’s ability to marry111 in violation of the couple’s rights to equal protection and
perhaps due process.112
¶49
There are two problems with this claim. First, it misunderstands how the proposed
Marriage Conscience Protection would operate. As Part III explained, under the
proposed exemption a religious objector may step aside only if another willing clerk can
perform the service. Thus, same-sex couples receive a license as “promptly” as
heterosexual couples.113 As a consequence, no same-sex couple or class of persons is
ever denied a public service. Further, even though the state may impose considerable
inconveniences on persons who seek to marry short of significant interference, as this
part explains, same-sex couples who receive a license and civil ceremony as “promptly”
as heterosexual couples would not be burdened by an exemption, let alone experience the
kind of “significant interference” that triggers an Equal Protection violation.114
¶50
Second, as explained below, the constitutional requirement of Equal Protection
demands that no person experience “significant interference” when accessing marriage,
not that a couple has a right to have each and every employee in a government office
process their license. In fact, as long as a couple does not experience significant
interference in receiving a service giving them access to marriage—for example, the
necessary license—it would not matter whether a specific employee was exempted from
assisting the couple.
111

Id. at 293 (“Because the state creates this benefit, [marriage], denial of access to marriage has a very
different character from the state’s denial of funding for, or other restrictions on, abortion services.”)
(emphasis added).
112
Compare Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that restricting the freedom to marry on
racial grounds violates the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses), with Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.
374, 383 (1978) (noting that the law at issue in Loving “arbitrarily deprived the couple of a fundamental
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause, the freedom to marry”).
113
See supra Part III.A (discussing the meaning of terms like “promptly”); Proposed Marriage Conscience
Protection § (b)(2)(B), infra Appendix B.
114
This Article seeks only to answer whether a hardship exemption violates equal protection or due process
by frustrating the fundamental right to marry. Of course, any statute may be struck for employing an
impermissible classification. On its face, the proposed Marriage Conscience Protection treats all religious
objections to facilitating marriages alike. See supra Part III.A (discussing reasons why the proposed
Marriage Conscience Protection is not limited only to facilitating same-sex marriages). For a discussion of
how classifications based on race, gender, and sexual orientation receive different levels of scrutiny, see
Minow, supra note 79.
Moreover, an exemption may be challenged on other grounds, such as the Establishment Clause. See 2
KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS (2008). Professor
Greenawalt notes:
Among the most vexed questions in the law of the religion clauses is when a legal measure that
might otherwise be justified as an accommodation to free exercise is instead a forbidden
establishment of religion . . . . Scholars have fairly observed that the Supreme Court has given us
no theory, or no tenable theory, for drawing the line between permissible accommodation and
impermissible establishment.
Id. at 336. The question about “when a legal measure that might otherwise be justified as an
accommodation to free exercise [instead slips over into] a forbidden establishment of religion . . . [is]
[a]mong the most vexed questions in the law of the religion clauses. . . . [T]he Supreme Court has given us
no theory, or no tenable theory, for drawing the line between permissible accommodation and
impermissible establishment.” Id. at 336. Nonetheless, “the Court has consistently assumed . . . that some
accommodations in terms of religious exercise are all right.” Id. at 339. While a complete analysis of what
constitutes an acceptable measure is beyond the scope of this Article, the Court on multiple occasions has
suggested that Title VII’s call for measured accommodations of religious objectors would not violate the
Establishment Clause. See infra Part V.C.
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¶51

The “significant interference” test derives from a series of cases testing marriage
restrictions, beginning with the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1967 decision in Loving v.
Virginia.115 There, the Court invalidated Virginia’s anti-miscegenation statute outlawing
interracial marriages because it violated the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.116 Under the statute, a white person who wanted
to marry a black person, and vice versa, had no way around the statutory bar to that
marriage. By employing a classification based on race, Virginia violated the Equal
Protection Clause.117 The statute also erected an absolute bar to marriage, independently
triggering a due process violation.118 While the lower court correctly observed “that
marriage is a social relation subject to the State’s police power,” the Court found that
Virginia could not plausibly claim “that its powers to regulate marriage are unlimited
notwithstanding the commands of the Fourteenth Amendment.”119 The Court was
emphatic, however, that the decision did not invalidate all regulation of marriages, only
those that offend constitutional principles.120
¶52
Eleven years later in Zablocki v. Redhail,121 the Court struck down a Wisconsin
statute that prevented child support “deadbeats” from marrying. The challenged statute
could not survive strict scrutiny, because it significantly interfered with the fundamental
right to marry for those in the “affected class.”122 “These persons are absolutely
prevented from getting married.”123 While some child support debtors might be “able in
theory to satisfy the statute’s requirements, [they] will be sufficiently burdened by having
to do so that they will in effect be coerced into forgoing their right to marry.”124 Even
those who comply with the statute “suffer a serious intrusion into their freedom of choice
in an area in which we have held such freedom to be fundamental.”125
¶53
When a statute significantly interferes with a fundamental right, such as the right to
marry, the Zablocki Court explained, it must be supported by “sufficiently important state
interests and [be] closely tailored to effectuate only those interests.”126 Wisconsin’s
poorly drawn statute failed to advance the state’s purported interest—financial support of
children—since the statute did nothing to put more money in the hands of custodial
parents.127
115

Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
Id. at 11–12.
117
Id.
118
Id. at 12.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
434 U.S. 374 (1978).
122
Id. at 390–91.
123
Id. at 387.
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
Id. at 388.
127
Id. at 390. The Court noted that Wisconsin’s statute “merely prevents the applicant from getting
married, without delivering any money at all into the hands of the applicant’s poor children. More
importantly, regardless of the applicant’s ability or willingness to meet the statutory requirements, the State
already has numerous other means for exacting compliance with support obligations, means that are at least
as effective as the instant statute’s and yet do not impinge upon the right to marry.” Id. Further, it found
the statute to be both “grossly underinclusive” and “substantially overinclusive as well.” The statute was
underinclusive because it did “not limit in any way new financial commitments by the applicant other than
those arising out of the contemplated marriage. The statutory classification is substantially overinclusive as
well: Given the possibility that the new spouse will actually better the applicant’s financial situation, by
116
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Although Wisconsin overreached, the Court made clear again that the state may
legitimately regulate marriage, both substantively and procedurally. The Court
explained:
[W]e do not mean to suggest that every state regulation which relates in
any way to the incidents of or prerequisites for marriage must be subjected
to rigorous scrutiny. To the contrary, reasonable regulations that do not
significantly interfere with decisions to enter the marital relationship may
legitimately be imposed.128
Justice Stewart suggested a number of permissible areas of regulation in his concurrence:
Surely, for example, a state may legitimately say that no one can marry his
or her sibling, that no one can marry who is not at least 14 years old, that
no one can marry without first passing an examination for venereal
disease, or that no one can marry who has a living husband or wife.129

Like Justice Stewart, Justice Powell also recognized that marriage is “an area which
traditionally has been subject to pervasive state regulation.”130
¶55
Crucially, the majority distinguished Wisconsin’s statute from one upheld by the
Court in the same term.131 In Califano v. Jobst,132 the Court concluded that a statute
terminating insurance benefits to a disabled dependent child, Jobst, under the Social
Security Act because he married a woman not entitled to these benefits did not
significantly interfere with the choice to marry.133 This was so even though the couple
received $20 less per month after marrying than Jobst received prior to his marriage.134
The Court acknowledged that this financial hit “may have an impact on a secondary
beneficiary’s desire to marry, and may make some suitors less welcome than others.”135
Nonetheless, the statute terminating payments “is not rendered invalid simply because
some persons who might otherwise have married were deterred by the rule or because
some who did marry were burdened thereby.”136 Because the interference was not
significant, the statute did not trigger strict scrutiny.
contributing income from a job or otherwise, the statute in many cases may prevent affected individuals
from improving their ability to satisfy their prior support obligations.” Id.
128
Id. at 386–87.
129
Id. at 392.
130
Id. at 396 (Powell, J., concurring).
131
Id. at 387 n.12. For Chief Justice Burger, who concurred with the majority in Zablocki, the challenged
statute represented an “intentional and substantial interference with the right to marry.” Id. at 391 (Burger,
J., concurring). Chief Justice Burger also distinguished the Social Security provision in Jobst because it
only “indirect[ly] impact[ed]” the decision to marry. Id. (citing Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977)).
132
434 U.S. 47 (1977).
133
Id. at 54.
134
Id. at 57 n.17.
135
Id. at 58.
136
Id. at 54. The Court found that Congress elected to use “age and marital status [] to determine probable
dependency” to avoid individualized proof of dependency on a case-by-case basis: “A distinction between
married persons and unmarried persons is of a different character” than “[d]ifferences in race, religion, or
political affiliation [which] could not rationally justify a difference in eligibility for Social Security
benefits.” Id.
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As the Zablocki court explained, the “directness and substantiality of the
interference with the freedom to marry [in Zablocki] distinguish[ed]” it from Jobst:
[T]he rule terminating benefits upon marriage was not “an attempt to
interfere with the individual’s freedom to make a decision as important as
marriage.” The Social Security provisions placed no direct legal obstacle
in the path of persons desiring to get married, and . . . there was no
evidence that the laws significantly discouraged, let alone made
“practically impossible,” any marriages. Indeed, the provisions had not
deterred the individual who challenged the statute from getting married,
even though he and his wife were both disabled.137

The trio of cases, Loving, Zablocki, and Jobst,138 make clear that “reasonable
regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital
relationship may legitimately be imposed.”139 A marriage restriction challenged on the
grounds that it violates the fundamental right to marry140 triggers strict scrutiny only if it
places a “direct legal obstacle in the path of persons desiring to get married.”141 In other
words, in such challenges, courts never get to strict scrutiny review unless the statute at
issue makes it very difficult for couples to marry.
¶58
The bar for constituting a significant interference with the fundamental right to
marriage is actually quite high. A long line of cases have upheld nepotism and exogamy
rules, as well as marriage penalties in subsidy programs and the tax code, against equal
protection challenges. In each instance, lower courts employed rational basis review142
because the regulations at issue did not directly and substantially interfere with the right
to marry.
¶59
In Wright v. Metrohealth Medical Center, for example, two public hospital coworkers married in violation of the hospital’s anti-nepotism policy, forcing one of them
to transfer jobs.143 The two met while working together on the hospital’s LifeFlight
emergency medical service. When they informed the hospital of their impending
marriage, the administration transferred the husband from Ohio to a facility in
¶57

137
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 387 n.12 (1978) (internal citations omitted). Chief Justice Burger
also distinguished the Social Security provision in Jobst because it only “indirect[ly] impact[ed]” the
decision to marry. Id. at 391.
138
In Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), the Court again affirmed the fundamental right to marry. There,
the Court struck a Missouri prison regulation that required compelling reasons—typically pregnancy or the
birth of an illegitimate child—in order for inmates to gain the prison superintendent’s permission to marry.
Id. While “[t]he right to marry, like many other rights, is subject to substantial restrictions as a result of
incarceration,” there remains “a constitutionally protected marital relationship in the prison context.” Id. at
95–96. In light of this protection, the Court found that these barriers to marriage were not reasonably
related to the proffered interests of prison security and rehabilitation. Id. at 98.
139
Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386–87 (emphasis added).
140
See supra note 114 (discussing impermissible classifications and other constitutional challenges).
141
Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 387 n.12 (internal citations omitted).
142
Rational basis review requires only that governmental action be rationally related to a legitimate
government interest; by contrast, strict scrutiny review requires that governmental action further a
compelling state interest and be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest by using the least restrictive
means possible. 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 403 (2010).
143
58 F.3d 1130, 1132 (6th Cir. 1995).
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Louisiana.144 Despite the significant penalty—a transfer across the country—the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit concluded that the hospital’s anti-nepotism
policy did not “directly and substantially interfere with the fundamental right to marry,
and thus, we hold that the district court did not err in subjecting the policy to rational
basis scrutiny.”145
¶60
In Vaughn v. Lawrenceburg Power System,146 the Sixth Circuit went even further.
A married couple, both of whom worked for Lawrenceburg Power System (LPS),
challenged the constitutionality of the company’s exogamy policy which provided that an
employee’s spouse could not also work for the company.147 One of the wedded pair
would have to quit working at the company or be terminated. When neither spouse
resigned after the marriage, LPS fired both of them.148 Despite the harshness of LPS’s
policy, the Sixth Circuit found it did not significantly interfere with the right to marry and
did not trigger strict scrutiny:
[T]he policy did not bar Jennifer or Keith from getting married, nor did it
prevent them marrying a large portion of population even in Lawrence
County. It only made it economically burdensome to marry a small
number of those eligible individuals, their fellow employees at LPS. Once
Jennifer and Keith decided to marry one another, LPS’s policy became
onerous for them, but ex ante, it did not greatly restrict their freedom to
marry or whom to marry.
Because the “the exogamy rule in itself must be considered a non-oppressive burden on
the right to marry, [it is] subject only to rational basis review by this court.”149
¶61
Nor does the treatment of married couples as a single person for purposes of
agricultural crop subsidy payments significantly interfere with the right to marry. In
Women Involved in Farm Economics v. United States Department of Agriculture, a
national organization challenged a Federal regulation that treated husbands and wives as
one “person.”150 In reviewing the regulation, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia found that strict scrutiny was “inappropriate because the rule does
not ‘interfere directly and substantially with the right to marry.’”151 Nor did the rule
144

Id.
Id. at 1135–36 (concluding that the “nepotism policy is necessary to (1) avoid potential conflicts that
might arise when two closely related persons allow their personal lives to impinge on their professional
lives, and (2) prevent morale among other workers from deteriorating due to the unique relationship
between the married co-workers.”). See also Waters v. Gaston Co., N.C., 57 F.3d 422, 426 (4th Cir. 1995)
(upholding a similar policy after employing rational basis review, concluding that the restriction advanced
the interests of “avoiding conflicts of interest between work-related and family-related obligations;
reducing favoritism or even the appearance of favoritism; preventing family conflicts from affecting the
workplace; and, by limiting inter-office dating, decreasing the likelihood of sexual harassment in the
workplace”).
146
269 F.3d 703 (6th Cir. 2001).
147
Id. at 706.
148
Id. at 708–709.
149
Id. at 712 (concluding that the exogamy rule “(1) prevent[ed] one employee from assuming the role of
‘spokesperson’ for both, (2) . . . avoid[ed] involving or angering a second employee when an employee is
reprimanded, (3) and avoid[ed] marital strife or fraternization in the workplace”).
150
876 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
151
Id. at 1004 (quoting Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 387 (1978)).
145
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“place[] [a] direct legal obstacle in the path of persons desiring to get married.”152 As
such, the Court limits its inquiry to asking whether “the legislation classif[ies] the person
it affects in a manner rationally related to legitimate government objectives.”153
¶62
In Druker v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, a married couple challenged the
constitutionality of the Federal income tax code’s “marriage penalty” for married couples
who file separate income tax returns.154 Rather than pay the penalty, the couple divorced
but continued to cohabitate. Despite the fact the Drukers would rather divorce than pay
the marriage penalty, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found the
tax provision did not significantly interfere with the choice to marry.155 “The adverse
effect of the ‘marriage penalty’ . . . like the effect of the termination of social security
benefits in Jobst, is merely ‘indirect’; while it may to some extent weight the choice of
whether to marry, it leaves the ultimate decision to the individual.”156
¶63
In short, lower courts have consistently sustained workplace policies that raise the
cost of marrying against claims of “significant interference” with the right to marry.
¶64
One way to understand the “significant interference” test is that it commits to the
government’s discretion decisions about how to frame and administer its marriage laws.
For instance, absent significant interference, no couple, heterosexual or same-sex, may
demand that lunch hours for clerks be limited to thirty minutes so they can receive their
marriage license more expeditiously. No couple could demand that a clerk’s office stay
open until the late evening to accommodate their schedule—absent significant
interference. These are matters for which the state need only a rational basis for deciding
how best to proceed.157 By the same token, marriage applicants have no Equal Protection
152

Id.
Id. (quoting Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981)). The court concluded that Congress has
“reasonably determined that married couples, as a group, are more likely than any other ‘partners’ in
farming enterprises to share completely in the products of their efforts—in other words, to be economically
interdependent.” Id. at 1007. See also Martin v. Bergland, 639 F.2d 647, 650 (10th Cir. 1981).
154
697 F.2d 46, 47–48 (2d Cir. 1982).
155
Id. at 50.
156
Id. at 50 (“[T]he objectives sought by the 1969 Act—the maintenance of horizontal equity and
progressivity, and the reduction of the differential between single and married taxpayers—were clearly
compelling.”).
157
One rational basis for a hardship exemption would obviously be to preserve as much religious freedom
as possible in a liberal society. See infra Part V (discussing state and Federal Religious Freedom
Restoration Acts). Another ground would be to avoid needlessly imposing costs on religious objectors
when there is no adverse effect on the government’s operation or the public’s interests. See supra Part
III.B. Exemptions also provide “elbow room” for individuals with minority viewpoints in society, allowing
citizens with widely divergent views to live together in a pluralistic society. Id. Exemptions may also
honor the settled expectations of valued, long-term employees. See supra Part II.B.
Legislatures may also justify exemptions on the prudential ground that they “lower the stakes” in the
debate about same-sex marriage, about which public opinion continues to be deeply divided. See, e.g.,
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Andrew Koppelman, & George Dent, Noah’s Curse and Paul’s Admonition: How
the Civil Rights Revolution Helps Us Understand Recent Clashes Between Religious Liberty and Gay
Equality, in ANDREW KOPPELMAN, & GEORGE DENT, MUST GAY RIGHTS CONFLICT WITH RELIGIOUS
IDENTITY? (forthcoming 2010) (“[J]udges are incompetent to resolve these issues where the nation is
closely but intensely divided but they can and ought to lower the stakes of such primordial politics.
Lowering the stakes means that judges should not prematurely constitutionalize fundamental issues where
the nation is not settled; on the other hand, judges can sometimes ameliorate local conflicts that have
escalated.”); Robin Fretwell Wilson, Same-Sex Marriage Law Lacks Religious Protection, BANGOR DAILY
NEWS, Oct. 17, 2009, http://www.bangordailynews.com/detail/125681.html (arguing that religious liberty
exemptions in same-sex marriage laws “go a long way to turning down the temperature in the heated debate
over” same-sex marriage).
153
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basis158 for demanding that clerks not be permitted to step aside from facilitating
marriages that for them violate deeply held religious beliefs so long as the applicants are
admitted to the status of marriage without significant interference.
¶65
The principle that emerges from this analysis is that allowing some limited
religious liberty exemptions for government employees, cabined by hardship to same-sex
couples, would not somehow deprive same-sex couples of the right to marry. Should a
clerk object to issuing a marriage license to a same-sex couple for religious reasons,
another clerk in the same office must do the job.159 Such limited accommodations never
“place[] a direct legal obstacle” on the path to marriage for same-sex couples.
V. PUBLIC SERVICE UNTAINTED BY RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS
¶66

Some assert that since “state officers have duties of equal respect to all persons
within the state[, i]t is very difficult to see how one can square such a duty with a right,
religion-based or otherwise, to refuse to provide public services.”160 The logic of this
claim seems to be that laws allowing religious exemptions should never be applied to
permit an employee to decline to serve any member of the public.161 This claim falters
on three grounds. First, it under appreciates the impact of an exemption qualified by
hardship and assumes, incorrectly, that an exemption will affect whether the service is
received.162 Second, it overlooks specific statutory directions to Federal and state
governments to not burden religious practices. These statutes embody the legislative
judgment “that religious exemptions ought often be granted.”163
¶67
For example, the Federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993164 and looka-like statutes in nineteen states165 (together, “RFRAs”) “facially require strict scrutiny of
158

Again, this analysis assumes that the statute does not make an impermissible classification. See supra
note 114 (discussing other grounds on which an exemption may be challenged).
159
See infra Appendix B.
160
Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 2, at 294. The authors softened their position from their original draft, in
which they stated, “the public has the right to expect that the religious convictions of public employees,
uncoerced in their choice of job, will not affect those employees’ duties about whom to serve and protect.”
Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Same-Sex Family Equality and Religious Freedom 51–53 (2009)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
161
Put another way, this claim seems to assert that the denial of a service should be categorically
impermissible even though other accommodations short of denial would not be. Certainly in the abortion
context, it is difficult to see how the denial of a service to the public necessarily invalidates an
accommodation when Congress has extended conscience protections to all physicians, even those in the
government’s employ. See Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Limits of Conscience: Moral Clashes over Deeply
Divisive Healthcare Procedures, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 41, 54 (2008). More directly relevant here, the clerk
cases illustrate that Title VII embraces the accommodation of government employees who ask not to fulfill
a specific task needed by the public when that task can be provided by another willing employee. See Part
V.B.
162
See supra Part III.A.
163
Volokh, supra note 108, at 617.
164
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-4 (1994). In City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), the U.S. Supreme
Court found that the Federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act was unconstitutional as applied to the
states.
165
SIDLEY AUSTIN BROWN & WOOD LLP, RELIGIOUS INST. PRACTICE GROUP, QUESTION AND ANSWERS
ABOUT STATE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACTS (4th ed. 2005), available at
http://www.sidley.com/publications/Detail.aspx?pub=1978 (listing RFRAs in Alabama, Arizona,
Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin). Of these
states, only Connecticut presently recognizes same-sex marriage and also has a state RFRA. See CONN.
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all substantial burdens on religious practices.”166 Importantly, RFRAs on their face
provide “no exceptions for the government acting in special capacities,”167 for instance,
as an employer. These statutes affirm that the government can, and indeed must in
covered jurisdictions, attempt to respect the religious beliefs of their employees. Because
state RFRAs “are not frequently invoked,” however, the outer limits of the state’s duty to
accommodate religious beliefs are not well-defined.168
¶68
Of the states that have recognized same-sex marriage, one, Connecticut, had
already enacted a statewide RFRA.169 Perhaps not surprisingly, Connecticut also enacted
its same-sex marriage law with meaningful exemptions.
¶69
Third, the claim that government employees should leave their religious
convictions at the office door or forego government jobs entirely170 also ignores federal
law that balances both religious observance and workplace demands. Specifically, Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)171 requires employers, including the
government, to provide reasonable accommodations of an employee’s religious practice
or belief unless the employer will experience an undue hardship.172 While Title VII’s
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-571b (2010). See also Eugene Volokh, RFRA State Map,
http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/relmap.pdf (last visited Sept. 3, 2010) (reporting states with state
constitutional amendments, statutory RFRAs, and state constitutional free exercise clauses interpreted to
require strict scrutiny).
166
Volokh, supra note 108, at 598 (arguing that while “RFRAs have more specific, binding text than does
the Free Exercise Clause,” they nonetheless leave a number of open questions, “creat[ing] opportunities for
judicial creativity . . . [and] for error and unequal treatment”).
167
Id. at 635.
168
Posting of Marci Hamilton, Cardozo School of Law Professor, to Religious Liberty listserv,
http://www.mail-archive.com/religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu/msg07597.html (Aug. 13, 2008). But see 1 KENT
GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS, 211 n.32 (2008) (noting
that courts have been hesitant to find a substantial burden in many RFRA cases).
169
See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52–571b.
170
See supra notes § 5, 28, 31, and 39 (discussing resignations and calls that employees resign). For a
recent example of this claim in the healthcare context, see Ben Smith, Coakley’s Conscience Clause,
http://www.politico.com/blogs/bensmith/0110/Coakleys_conscience_clause.html (Jan. 15, 2010, 10:41
EST) (discussing Massachusetts Senate candidate Martha Coakley’s statement on opponent Scott Brown’s
support for a religious exemption for emergency room personnel opposed to dispensing emergency
contraceptives; Coakley observed: “You can have religious freedom but you probably shouldn’t work in
the emergency room.”). This statement drew criticism from Nathan Diament of the Orthodox Union
because “‘Massachusetts state law is a model for balancing the rights of religious employees for religious
accommodation in the workplace—even a workplace such as an ER, with the need for employers to deliver
goods and services to consumers,’ he said in an email. ‘This law is designed to assure that people of any
faith can pursue any career they choose, and not fear they will be excluded because of their commitments
of conscience.’” For a discussion of Federal conscience protections for healthcare workers, see Letter from
Nathan J. Diament, Reverend Joel Hunter, Douglas Kmiec, Dr. Richard Land, Melissa Rogers, Rabbi
David Saperstein, Reverend Jim Wallis, and Robin Fretwell Wilson to U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs. (Apr. 7, 2009) (on file with author) (regarding Proposed Rescission of Bush “Conscience
Regulation”).
171
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2010).
172
The U.S. Supreme Court has grappled with the permissibility of religious accommodations under Title
VII on several occasions. In Thornton v. Caldor, the Court held that a Connecticut statute, which provided
Sabbath observers with an absolute and unqualified right not to work on their chosen Sabbath, violated the
Establishment Clause, but suggested that Title VII’s call for more measured accommodations would not.
472 U.S. 703 (1985). Thornton, a Presbyterian who observed a Sunday Sabbath, worked for Caldor, Inc. in
one of its retail stores. Id. at 705. After declining to work on Sundays, Thornton invoked the protection of
a Connecticut statute that provided: “No person who states that a particular day of the week is observed as
his Sabbath may be required by his employer to work on such day. An employee’s refusal to work on his
Sabbath shall not constitute grounds for his dismissal.” Id. at 706. Caldor offered to transfer Thornton,
who refused and was subsequently demoted. Id. at 706. Thornton resigned and filed a grievance with the
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literal requirements have been thinned out by a later U.S. Supreme Court case,173 this part
State Board of Mediation and Arbitration, where he prevailed. Id. at 706–07.
The Court concluded that the statute violated the Establishment Clause, citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602 (1971). Id. at 708, 710–11. Under Lemon, to pass constitutional muster, a statute must not only
have a secular purpose, it must not foster excessive entanglement of the government with religion, nor can
it have a primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. Id. at 708. Because the Connecticut statute
contained no exception for “special circumstances,” it could impose substantial burdens on employers or
other employees. Id. at 709. This might occur, for example, if a Friday Sabbath observer worked in a job
with a Monday to Friday schedule, forcing the employer to arrange coverage. Likewise, an absolute right
to accommodation could force other employees to work in the Sabbath observer's place. Id. at 709–710.
Because the accommodation was unqualified, Connecticut's statute had a primary effect of advancing a
religious practice. Id. at 710.
Justice O’Connor concurred, focusing primarily on the message conveyed by Connecticut’s unqualified
accommodation. She concluded that the statute endorsed “a particular religious belief, to the detriment of
those who do not share it.” Id. at 711 (O’Connor, J., concurring). However, she was careful to distinguish
Title VII, which in her view “calls for reasonable rather than absolute accommodation.” Id. at 712. Title
VII extends “[protection to] all religious beliefs and practices rather than protecting only the Sabbath
observance.” Id. Unlike the Connecticut statute, Justice O'Connor concluded that an “objective observer
would perceive [Title VII] as an anti-discrimination law rather than an endorsement of religion or a
particular religious practice.” Id.
A later, direct challenge to Title VII maintained that its exemption of religious organizations from the
general proscription on religiously based employment discrimination impermissibly “singles out religious
entities for a benefit.” Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987). In Amos, Arthur
Frank Mayson worked as a building engineer for a nonprofit gymnasium operated by nonprofit groups
affiliated with the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (LDS Church). Id. at 330. Mayson failed to
qualify for a “temple recommend,” which would have certified him as a member of the LDS Church, and
was subsequently terminated from his position. Id. Writing for the majority, Justice White explained that
when the “government acts with the proper purpose of lifting a regulation that burdens the exercise of
religion, . . . the exemption [need not] come packaged with benefits to secular entities.” Id. at 338. Indeed,
the Court “has never indicated that statutes that give special consideration to religious groups are per se
invalid. That would run contrary to the teaching of our cases that there is ample room for accommodation
of religion under the Establishment Clause.” Id. The Court further held that “laws ‘affording a uniform
benefit to all religions’” are not “subject to strict scrutiny,” but rather “should be analyzed under Lemon.”
Id. at 339. Because Title VII’s exemption for religious organizations was “neutral on its face and
motivated by a permissible purpose of limiting governmental interference with the exercise of religion,” the
Court saw “no justification for applying strict scrutiny to a statute that passes the Lemon test.” Id.
Mayson and other petitioners also urged that “an exemption statute will always have the effect of
advancing religion and hence be invalid under the second (effects) part of the Lemon test.” Id. at 335.
Rejecting this argument, the Court noted:
For a law to have forbidden "effects" under Lemon, it must be fair to say that the government
itself has advanced religion through its own activities and influence. As the Court observed in
Walz, “for the men who wrote the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment the ‘establishment’
of a religion connoted sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in
religious activity.”
Id. at 337 (internal citations omitted).
Although the lower court feared that the exemption “would permit churches with financial resources
impermissibly to extend their influence and propagate their faith by entering the commercial, profit-making
world,” there was no evidence in the record that “the [LDS] Church's ability to propagate its religious
doctrine through the gymnasium is any greater now than it was prior to the passage of” Title VII. Id.
More recently, the Court reaffirmed the permissibility of accommodations outside Title VII that
“confer[] no privileged status on any particular religious sect, and single[] out no bona fide faith for
disadvantageous treatment.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 724 (2005). Cutter unanimously rejected
an Establishment Clause challenge to the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
because, among other reasons, it mitigated “exceptional government-created burdens on private religious
exercise,” and took into account the burdens that accommodations would impose on non-beneficiaries. Id.
at 720.
173
Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) (holding that Title VII does not require an
accommodation that would cause more than a minimal hardship to the employer or other employees.). In
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shows that real and concrete accommodations are not only possible but have been offered
to religious objectors even in the cases giving government employers the greatest
leeway—those involving public safety. Just as revealing, a trio of cases brought by
clerks and administrative agents shows the strength of Title VII claims for
accommodation by persons in routine, predictable administrative roles. In synthesizing
these cases, this part concludes that none of the special constraints tying the
government’s hands in its role as public protector—such as the need to be ready at all
times for a breach of peace or other calamity—would necessarily prevent exemptions for
clerks in state licensure offices.
A. The Public Protector Cases
¶70

Critics of public servant exemptions rely on cases testing whether Title VII
demands particular accommodations for police officers who, for religious reasons, refuse
to guard businesses offering morally-laden services, like gambling or abortion.174 In
Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, for example, a Catholic Chicago police officer, Angelo
Rodriguez, requested a reassignment after being posted at an abortion clinic in his
district.175 Officer Rodriguez expressed willingness to serve in the event of an
emergency breach of peace at the clinic but asked not to be assigned active duty at the
clinic since it would violate “religious beliefs . . . that prohibit [his] participation in
keeping abortion clinics open.”176 The Rodriguez court noted that “[u]nder Title VII . . .
an employer must reasonably accommodate an employee's religious observance or
practice unless it can demonstrate that such accommodation would result in an undue
hardship to the employer's business.”177 Indeed, the court ultimately ruled that the city’s
offer to transfer Rodriguez to a district “comparable to [his own] but without abortion
clinics,” with “no reduction in his level of pay or benefits,”178 was “a paradigm of
reasonable accommodation.”179 In a special concurrence, Judge Posner argued for a
broader holding but agreed that the majority’s “narrow” decision that “the city made a
Hardison, the Court noted but did not reach a separate ground for objection to Title VII’s religious
accommodation provisions, that it violates the Establishment Clause. Id. at 70. In this view, requiring an
employer to give a Christian her Sundays off so that she can honor her religious tenets while denying an
Atheist the same consideration simply because she would use the time for secular purposes is
unconstitutional. See, e.g., HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR. & ELIZABETH J. NORMAN, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.23 (2d. ed. 2004). Religious accommodations under Title VII
have survived challenge in the Courts of Appeals, largely because Title VII does not require “absolute
deference to the religious practices of the employee, allows for consideration of the hardship to other
employees and to the company, and permits an evaluation of whether the employer has attempted to
accommodate the employee.” Protos v. Volkswagen of Am., 797 F.2d 129, 136 (3d Cir. 1986) (listing
similar cases from the Courts of Appeals in the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits). See also LEWIS &
NORMAN, supra note 173, at 128.
174
See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 2, at 84-6.
175
Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, 156 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 1998).
176
Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, No. 95 C 5371, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 533, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 11,
1996), aff’d, 156 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 1998).
177
Rodriguez, 156 F.3d at 775 (emphasis added).
178
Id. at 775–76. Under the terms of his employment with the city, the officer had a number of avenues
available to keep his job while avoiding clinic duty, including: (1) transferring with no change in salary or
benefits to one of six districts that contained no abortion clinic; (2) changing his shift; (3) changing his start
time; or (4) applying for “special function assignments.” Id. at 774–75.
179
Id. at 775 (quoting Wright v. Runyon, 2 F.3d 214, 217 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1121
(1994) (internal quotations omitted)).
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reasonable effort to accommodate Officer Rodriguez’s religious beliefs . . . is
convincing.”180
¶71
Like Title VII itself, Rodriguez affirms Title VII’s legal duty to accommodate
religious beliefs while leaving open what constitutes a reasonable accommodation.
Nonetheless, critics of exemptions for public employees cite Rodriguez because of a
passage in Chief Judge Posner’s concurrence. In dicta, Judge Posner went beyond the
narrow holding to advocate that public safety officers “have no right under Title VII to
recuse themselves from having to protect persons of whose activities they disapprove for
religious (or any other) reasons.”181 As Posner explained,
When the business of the employer is to protect the public safety, the
maintenance of public confidence in the neutrality of the protectors is
central to effective performance, and the erosion of that confidence by
recognition of a right of recusal by public-safety officers would so
undermine the agency's effective performance as to constitute an undue
hardship within the meaning of the statute.182
¶72

Despite Posner’s concerns about the practicality of exemptions, the city appears to
have staffed around Officer Rodriguez’s refusal without great hardship. In the ten
months leading up to the district court hearing, Officer Rodriguez capitalized on other
assignments available to him to keep his job while avoiding permanent clinic duty183—
suggesting that the city’s standard accommodations did not affect police department
effectiveness.184 Indeed, as the court recognized, the city posted other officers at the
clinic on a weekly basis for multiple shifts over a ten-month period despite Officer
Rodriguez’s technical unavailability.185
¶73
A later Seventh Circuit case considered a different question, namely whether when
“no accommodation was attempted . . . [if] the statute requires one.”186 In that case,
Officer Endres, a Baptist opposed to gambling, was assigned to a casino. He asked to be
transferred from the casino facility, which was not possible once “an actual assignment
[was] made.”187 When Endres refused to report for duty at the casino, he was fired.188
Endres sued, arguing that he should have been given another assignment outside the Blue
Chip Casino.
¶74
Ironically, Endres involved two accommodations: the one Endres was offered and
the one he was not. As the lower court decision explained, when Endres
informed the Superintendent that his religious convictions would conflict
with his assignment as a gaming agent . . . [t]he Superintendent asked
Endres whether he could work on the dock or other location nearing the
180

Rodriguez, 156 F.3d at 779.
Id. (Posner, J., concurring).
182
Id. at 779–80.
183
Id. at 774–75.
184
Id. at 779–80.
185
Id. at 775.
186
Endes v. Ind. State Police, 349 F.3d 922, 926 (7th Cir. 2003).
187
Id.
188
Id. at 924.
181
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gaming boat, e.g., hotel lobbies, lounges, or parking lots. Endres
responded that he could not become a gaming agent in any form, even a
modified version.189
Thus, Endres was offered an exemption to accommodate his religious beliefs, just not one
that was acceptable to him.190
¶75
Although Endres’ Superintendent attempted to accommodate Endres, 191 the
Seventh Circuit treated the case as one in which no accommodation had been attempted.
Judge Easterbrook’s opinion begins by noting that “Indiana concedes that the State Police
must not discriminate against any religious faith,” then proceeds to consider whether
accommodation of Endres’ “desire for different duties” other than at the Blue Chip
Casino was demanded by Section 701(j) of Title VII. While the Court noted that the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in Trans World Airlines v. Hardison192 “does not require an
accommodation that would cause more than a minimal hardship to the employer or other

189
Endres v. Ind. State Police, 794 N.E.2d 1089, 1092 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), aff’d in part and superseded in
part, Endres v. Ind. State Police, 809 N.E.2d 320 (Ind. 2004).
190
A third Seventh Circuit case also considered “[r]eligiously motivated selectivity” in performing the
requirements of one’s job. Ryan v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 950 F.2d 458, 461 (7th Cir. 1991). In that case,
John C. Ryan, an FBI agent in charge of domestic security and terrorism investigations in Peoria, Illinois,
informed his superiors that his religious beliefs prevented him from handling certain assignments. Id. In
particular, he was unwilling to participate in cases investigating the “PLOWSHARES” Group for
vandalism and destruction of government property as nonviolent protests of violence. Id. at 459.
Another agent offered to exchange assignments, something done for Agent Ryan in the past, but he
declined. Id. Instead, Ryan wanted to stay put but “would not promise to carry out similar orders in the
future and implied that he would refuse to participate in related matters.” Id. at 461. After hearings, Ryan
was terminated. Id. at 460.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit observed that, under Title VII, “[r]eligiously motivated selectivity in the
work one is willing to perform is an ‘aspect of religious observance and practice’ that the employer must
disregard unless it demonstrates that it is ‘unable to reasonably accommodate…without undue hardship.’”
Id. at 461. As it did in Endres, the Court acknowledged how difficult it is “for any organization to
accommodate employees who are choosy about assignments; for a paramilitary organization the tension is
even greater. Conscientious objectors in the military seek discharge, which accommodates their beliefs and
the military’s need for obedience. Ryan received discharge but does not want it. He wants to be an agent
and to choose his assignments too.” Id. at 462. On the merits of Ryan’s claim, the court found that
“[r]eallocation of work between agents is the most obvious accommodation,” and that because Ryan
refused this offer, the FBI [the court] was not required to consider “undue hardship.” Id. at 461.
191
See infra notes 185–188 and accompanying text.
192
In Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, Hardison, an employee of TWA, “began to study the religion
known as the Worldwide Church of God.” 432 U.S. 63, 67 (1977). Hardison informed his superiors that,
as part of his religion, he could no longer work between sundown on Friday and Saturday. Id. at 67–68.
Hardison’s request was initially honored, as his seniority allowed him to be scheduled for shifts without
Saturdays, in accordance with TWA’s collective bargaining agreement. Subsequently, Hardison requested
and was granted a transfer to another building, where he had no seniority. Id. at 68. As a result, the only
shifts available to him included work on Saturdays. Id. The airline refused to allow him to work only four
days a week or to schedule another worker not regularly assigned to work Saturdays to take his place, as
doing so would require the payment of premium wages. Id. The airline also refused to shift other Saturday
workers or a supervisor to his position, as doing so “would simply have undermanned another operation.”
Id. at 69. Hardison refused to show up for work on Saturdays and so, after a hearing, was terminated for
insubordination. Id.
The Court held that Title VII does not require employers to bear more than a de minimis burden to
reasonably accommodate religious observers. Id. at 84. The duty to accommodate the religious beliefs of
an employee did not compel the airline to violate the seniority system established under its collective
bargaining agreement. Id. at 79.
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employees,”193 it did not resolve Endres’ request for a transfer under the “undue
hardship” prong.194 Instead, the Court concluded that “Endres has made a demand that it
would be unreasonable to require any police or fire department to tolerate.”195
¶76
In Endres’ case, not enough officers volunteered for casino duty, forcing the State
Police to draft officers. In such a system, “[e]xcusing officers from the risk of unpopular
assignments would create substantial costs for fellow officers who must step in, as well
as the police force as an entity.”196 Further, “[e]ven if it proves possible to swap
assignments on one occasion, another may arise when personnel are not available to
cover for selective objectors.”197 In a heterogeneous force, “juggling assignments to
make each compatible with the varying religious beliefs of [the officers] would be
daunting to managers and difficult for other officers who would be called on to fill in for
the objectors.”198 Even if it could be met “without undue hardship, this demand . . .
would not be reasonable—and § 701(j) calls only for reasonable accommodations.”199
The court ultimately concluded that “paramilitary organizations,” like fire departments
and police departments, that choose not to accommodate an officer have not violated
Title VII because of the unique constraints departments charged with public protection
may be under.200
¶77
Endres unsuccessfully petitioned for rehearing en banc.201 Three judges who
dissented from the rehearing’s denial faulted the majority decision for “blue pencil[ing]
the reasonable accommodation requirement from the statute as it applies to police and

193

Trans World Airlines v. Hardison is criticized for scaling back an employer’s duties to provide
accommodation under Title VII. See James M. Oleske, Jr., Federalism, Free Exercise, and Title VII:
Reconsidering Reasonable Accommodation, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 525, 533–34 (2004) (describing the
“Court’s watered-down interpretation of the ‘undue hardship’ standard”). Since Trans World Airlines v.
Hardison, there have been legislative efforts to provide greater religious protection to employees. See
Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 2007, H.R. 1431, 110th Cong. (2007), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-1431&tab=summary (amending “the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 to modify the definition of ‘religion’ for purposes of coverage under that Act by requiring
employers to make an affirmative and bona fide effort to reasonably accommodate the religious practices of
employees”) (referred to committee without further action); Hearing on H.R. 1431 Before the Subcomm. on
Health, Employment, Labor, and Pensions of the U.S. House of Rep. Comm. on Education and Labor (Feb.
12, 2008) (testimony of Helen Norton), available at http://edlabor.house.gov/testimony/2008-02-12HelenNorton.pdf) (pointing out that care must be taken to ensure that strengthening religious
accommodation for workers does not negatively affect “third parties’ civil rights, religious liberties,
reproductive rights, and other important health care needs”).
Notwithstanding Hardison, some commentators urge that “there remains a substantial category of lowto-no-cost accommodations that employers are often required to provide.” See Oleske, supra note 193, at
534 (collecting cases). See also infra Part V.B (discussing the accommodations of employees in routine,
predictable, administrative positions).
194
While “[r]easonableness and the avoidance of undue hardship are distinct, . . . [s]elective objection to
some of the employer's goals raises problems” on both branches, the Court noted. Endres v. Ind. State
Police, 349 F.3d 922, 925 (7th Cir. 2003). It nonetheless resolved Endres’ case on the reasonableness
prong. Id. at 929–30.
195
Id. at 926–27 (emphasis added).
196
Id. at 925 (emphasis added).
197
Id. at 927 (emphasis added).
198
Id. at 925.
199
Id.
200
Id.
201
See id. at 927–930 (Ripple, J., dissenting from a denial of a petition for rehearing en banc) (questioning
how the majority opinion can be reconciled with the court’s earlier opinion in Rodriguez).
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fire personnel”—in direct conflict with decisions of other circuits.202 A number of
Federal Courts of Appeal have concluded that public employers can accommodate the
religious beliefs of their employees while carrying out their core mission: providing
services to all who are entitled to them.203 For example, in Shelton v. University of
Medicine & Dentistry of New Jersey,204 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit considered a Title VII religious discrimination claim by a staff nurse, Yvonne
Shelton, who asked not to perform emergency abortions.205 Shelton worked in the Labor
and Delivery (L&D) section of a state hospital.206 Although the L&D section did not
provide elective abortions, occasionally emergencies required staff to terminate a
patient’s pregnancy.207 Shelton, a devout Pentecostal, refused to participate in these
procedures, in several instances delaying the emergency treatment.208 Due to budget
cuts, the hospital was unable to staff around Shelton’s refusal by looking to other nurses.
The hospital informed Shelton that she could no longer work in L&D, but offered to
transfer her to the Newborn Intensive Care Unit (NICU) or to help her secure an open
position elsewhere in the hospital system.209 Shelton refused, was fired, and
subsequently brought suit under Title VII, arguing religious discrimination.210
¶78
In its opinion, the court first concluded that Shelton had established a prima facie
case of religious discrimination. The burden then shifted “to the Hospital to show either
that it offered Shelton a reasonable accommodation, or that it could not do so because of
a resulting undue hardship.”211 The court accepted the hospital’s argument that it had
provided reasonable accommodations for Shelton; there was no evidence that the
proffered transfer would result in a loss of pay or benefits to Shelton or that she would be
asked to provide care in the NICU that would be “religiously intolerable.”212 Shelton’s
steadfast refusal to “cooperate in attempting the find an acceptable religious
accommodation was unjustified” and “undermined the cooperative approach to religious
accommodation that Congress intended to foster,” ultimately dooming her claim.213
¶79
The court then considered whether Title VII “required a presumption of undue
hardship” when applied to healthcare providers and other public protectors and concluded
that it did not.214 While the court recognized that public trust and confidence requires

202

See id. at 927 (noting that the majority’s decision “deprives those who serve us in important public
safety positions from a protection that they enjoy in every other circuit in the United States”).
203
Id. (collecting those decisions). These courts have rejected a per se presumption that accommodating a
public employee would either be unreasonable or an undue hardship on public employers. See also Part
V.B.
204
See Shelton v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 223 F.3d 220, 228 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding public
hospital had reasonably accommodated Pentecostal nurse opposed to assisting with emergency abortions by
offering her a transfer to a different unit).
205
Id. at 222.
206
Id.
207
Id.
208
Id. at 223.
209
Id.
210
Id.
211
Id. at 225.
212
Id. at 227.
213
Id. at 228. The Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the hospital.
214
Id.
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that healthcare professionals must “provide treatment in time of emergencies,” this did
not by itself negate the duty to attempt to take the objector out of that role.215
¶80
As this discussion shows, even in the cases most hostile to the need for
accommodations, those involving public protectors, public employers can and routinely
do offer new assignments, transfers, and low-level work-arounds short of a new
assignment, allowing the religious objector to step aside from services that violate deeply
held religious beliefs. As the next subpart illustrates, the case for religious exemptions
appears to be much more compelling to the courts when the government employee
occupies an administrative role in which the employee would only infrequently be asked
to provide the disputed service.
B. The Clerk Cases
¶81

In American Postal Worker’s Union v. Postmaster General, two mail clerks whose
religious beliefs prevented them from processing draft registration forms sued when a
U.S. Postal Service regulation prohibited them from passing the registrant onto another
clerk.216 The plaintiffs won in the District Court, which awarded summary judgment to
the clerks, finding that the Postal Service had violated Title VII.217 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded.218 It found that the
District Court failed to raise and answer one crucial question under Title VII: whether the
accommodation offered by the employer “reasonably preserves the affected employee’s
employment status, i.e., compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment.”219 The employees sought to stay in their present positions while simply
making referrals to another clerk.220 The Postal Service instead required them to transfer
to another position that did not require processing draft registration forms or to take all
registrants who presented.221 The employees initially refused, arguing that the Postal
Service’s “fix” forced them into a “less attractive employment status.”222
¶82
In addressing the sufficiency of the Postal Service’s proposed transfer, the court
began its analysis by noting that in any Title VII case where an employee seeks an
accommodation for religious reasons, the initial burden rests on the employee to establish
a prima facie case of religious discrimination.223 Once the employee carries this burden,
the employer must prove that “it made good faith efforts to accommodate that

215

Id.
Am. Postal Worker’s Union v. Postmaster Gen., 781 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1986).
217
Am. Postal Worker’s Union v. Postmaster Gen., 1984 WL 48892 (N.D. Cal. 1984). The District Court
held that “further accommodation requested by the plaintiffs—allowing [them] to refer draft registrants to
other available window clerks—cannot fairly be said to cause the Postal Service ‘undue hardship’” and that
this “failure to implement the reasonable accommodation proposed by the plaintiffs violates the Postal
Service’s statutory obligation to prevent unnecessary interference with the bona fide religious beliefs of its
employee [] without undue hardship.” Id. (emphasis in original).
218
Am. Postal Worker’s Union, 781 F.2d at 777.
219
Id.
220
Id. at 774.
221
Id.
222
Id. at 776. One employee eventually transferred under protest, while the second agreed to process the
draft registration forms under protest. Id. at 774.
223
Id. at 775–76.
216
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employee’s religious belief.”224 Any accommodation proposed by the employer must
eliminate the religious conflict while reasonably preserving the employee’s status.225
The Ninth Circuit found that the Postal Service’s proposed transfer would eliminate
the conflict, but it remanded for a determination of whether a transfer would negatively
impact the employees’ work status.226 Importantly, while the court recognized that “a
reasonable accommodation need not be on the employee’s terms only,”227 it ultimately
concluded that “[w]here the employer’s proposal does not reasonably preserve the
affected employee’s status . . . the employer has not satisfied its obligation [under Title
VII].”228
Like the clerks in American Postal Worker’s Union, a clerk in McGinnis v. United
States Postal Service objected to processing draft registration forms.229 In this case,
however, the Postal Service served McGinnis with a thirty-day notice of dismissal for
refusing to handle the registration forms.230 McGinnis then sought a preliminary
injunction to prevent her discharge.231 At trial, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California found that in moving to discharge McGinnis, the Postal
Service likely violated Title VII. The court undertook fact-specific inquiry into both
“reasonable accommodation” and “undue hardship.”232
Using the burden-shifting framework described above, the court found that the
Postal Service was “unlikely to meet its burden of showing good faith effort to
accommodate [McGinnis’] beliefs” because it reflexively informed McGinnis that she
had no choice but to perform the objectionable service.233 The Postal Service did not
explore a transfer to other duties nor did it explore how costly another low-level workaround would be.234
The court also found that McGinnis “demonstrated at least a high probability of
ultimate success on the merits of her Title VII claim,”235 entitling her to the injunction.
McGinnis would likely succeed on the undue hardship prong, the court noted, because
“‘undue hardship’ must mean present undue hardship,” not “speculative disruption,” on
which the Postal Service had relied.236
A third case, Haring v. Blumenthal,237 involved a Catholic agent at the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) who processed applications for tax exemption. The IRS did not
promote the agent “solely” because he “refus[ed] to handle exemptions from persons or
224

Id. at 776.
Id.
226
Id. at 777.
227
Id. Specifically, employers need not accept “any accommodation, short of ‘undue hardship,’ proposed
by an employee.” Id. at 776 (emphasis added).
228
Id.
229
McGinnis v. U.S. Postal Serv., 512 F. Supp. 517 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
230
Id. at 519.
231
Id.
232
Id. at 523.
233
Id.
234
Id. (“First the affidavits from both sides show that the Postal Service made virtually no effort to
accommodate Petitioner's beliefs. The government offers little explanation why it did not even try to
negotiate an arrangement that would, for example, have enabled Petitioner to work at a window not used
for registration materials.”).
235
Id. at 524.
236
Id.
237
Haring v. Blumenthal, 471 F. Supp. 1172 (D.D.C. 1979).
225
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groups which advocate abortions or other practices to which he objects.”238 He sued
under Title VII, claiming religious discrimination.
¶88
In rejecting the government’s motion for summary judgment on the Title VII claim,
the court found that the number of cases that the plaintiff objected to working on a
miniscule fraction of the overall volume of his work, at most “less than 2% of his total
workload.”239 With so few objections, another reviewer could process those cases
without any undue hardship to the IRS.240 This work-around was both feasible and not
likely to be taxing to the IRS even if willing reviewers were absent or took scheduled
vacation.241 Nor would there likely be “any significant expense or loss of time, by
another reviewer.”242 If the agent’s objections to specific work later expanded to
comprise a significant amount of his total workload, the IRS would then be permitted to
show undue hardship.243 But until then, the court would be guided by the present
circumstances, not an unanchored prediction as to what might happen in the future.
¶89
The Haring court grappled explicitly with what an accommodation might mean for
“taxpayer confidence in the tax system.”244 Allowing the agent to “disqualify himself
and request that the matter be reassigned to another reviewer” when “there is a conflict
between his beliefs and what the law would require him to decide,” would likely not
“impair taxpayer confidence.”245 The agent did “not assert that he will tailor his
decisions to his beliefs but merely that, when there is a conflict between his beliefs and
what the law would require him to decide” would likely not threaten public confidence.
The court found it:
difficult to see how [recusal] could impair taxpayer confidence in the tax
system or the impartiality of the IRS. On the contrary, decision-makers at
all levels not infrequently face conflicts of interest financial, family238

Id. at 1180. “For the purposes of the [] motion,” the government conceded that the “plaintiff was not
promoted solely because of his inability or unwillingness to abide by Internal Revenue Service polices on
abortion.” Id. at 1175.
239
Id. at 1180 (“Plaintiff's affidavit which for present purposes must be assumed to be true asserts that in
his experience the types of cases with which he might have a moral or religious problem constitute only a
minute percentage of the total volume of applications for exemption processed by a reviewer in the Exempt
Organizations Division. He estimates that percentage to constitute ‘a fraction of 1% of the total cases or at
most less than 2%.’”).
240
Id. at 1183; id. at 1180 (“Assuming this volume of cases to be accurate, it appears that the Internal
Revenue Service should have no difficulty, on a purely mechanical level, to accommodate itself to the overt
manifestations of plaintiff's beliefs. The applications for exemption which plaintiff refuses to handle could
clearly be processed without undue hardship or burden to the Service.”).
241
Id. at 1180 n.23 (“If one of the two reviewers assigned to a particular group of tax law specialists should
be absent for a few days for one reason or another, and plaintiff, as a reviewer, were to be excused from
processing objectionable applications, IRS operations would still not be significantly impaired, for even in
the normal course of events there is a delay of several weeks or months between the submission of
applications for tax exemption and the IRS decision thereon.”).
242
Id. at 1183.
243
Id. at 1182 (“[I]f, contrary to the assumptions made by the Court, it subsequently develops either that
plaintiff enlarges the zone of his objections to such an extent that it encompasses a significant part of his
assigned workload, or that other IRS employees follow his example and refuse to handle a significant
number of applications for tax exemptions on grounds of offensiveness to religious belief, then at some
point the level of ‘undue hardship’ provided for in the statute will have been reached, and defendant will
then be free to take all appropriate and necessary action.”).
244
Id. at 1183.
245
Id.
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related, or concerning matters of conscience or fixed opinion. Officials
are justly criticized when they make decisions notwithstanding interest or
bias, particularly when there is no disclosure.
For the court, disclosure and recusal built public confidence:
Law and public policy encourage disclosure and disqualification, and
public confidence in our institutions is strengthened when a decisionmaker disqualifies himself on account of financial interest, inseparable
bias, or the appearance of partiality. In a very significant sense . . . public
policy favors the course of disclosure of bias and disqualification that this
plaintiff has chosen, and that course may not be regarded as impairing the
integrity of the IRS decision-making function.246
In the end, the agent prevailed at a crucial juncture in the litigation, surviving summary
judgment.247
¶90
As these cases illustrate, religious accommodations for employees in routine,
predictable assignments seem to pose far less difficulty than accommodations for public
protectors for the courts, which are charged with untangling what will and will not be a
reasonable accommodation short of undue hardship to the employer. Importantly, all of
the clerk cases came after and cited the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1975 decision in TWA v.
Hardison.248
C. Lessons for Same-Sex Marriage Exemptions
¶91

How does Title VII’s duty to accommodate religious objections bear on the
question of exemptions for government employees? First, the demands made by Title
VII on employers means that the question of accommodation is not as easy as saying that
all clerks must process same-sex marriage applications as a condition of employment or
face termination. Title VII sets up the norm that not only should the government
accommodate the employee if it reasonably can without undue hardship, but that the
accommodation should reasonably preserve that employee’s employment status.249 Thus,
it would seem insufficient without more to simply say to religious objectors “put up or
shut up.” Second, as McGinnis and Haring illustrate, speculative predictions regarding
future disruption are not to be considered. Rather, employers should be guided by the
facts on the ground.250
246

Id. at 1183.
Id. at 1180.
248
Compare Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977), with Am. Postal Worker’s Union v.
Postmaster Gen., 781 F.2d 772, 775 (9th Cir. 1986); see also McGinnis v. U.S. Postal Serv., 512 F. Supp.
517, 523 n.7 (N.D. Cal. 1980); Haring, 471 F. Supp. at 1181.
249
Am. Postal Worker’s Union, 781 F.2d at 776. The employment status includes compensation, terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment. Id.
250
See, e.g., Haring, 471 F. Supp. at 1182 (“‘[U]ndue hardship’ must mean present undue hardship, as
distinguished from anticipated or multiplied hardship. Were the law otherwise, any accommodation,
however slight, would rise to the level of an undue hardship because, if sufficiently magnified through
predictions of the future behavior of the employee's co-workers, even the most minute accommodation
could be calculated to reach that level.”).
247
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¶92

Third, while the public protector cases and clerk cases seem to point in very
different directions, this divergence is more apparent than real. True, the public protector
cases afford special scrutiny to accommodations for certain government employees, lest
public confidence in the government wane. But at most the public protector cases say
that government employees in “paramilitary” organizations charged with public
protection must check their consciences at the door—at least in the states encompassed
by the Seventh Circuit.251
¶93
For the Seventh Circuit, an absolute bar on accommodating such officials is
warranted, both as a matter of principle and as a matter of practicality. As Judge Posner
said in his concurrence in Rodriguez, “[w]hen . . . the maintenance of public confidence
in the neutrality of the protectors is central to effective performance . . . recusal [may
seriously] undermine the agency’s effective performance” and so become an undue
hardship to the government.252 After Endres, a fire or police department may steadfastly
refuse to provide any accommodation253 because of the job’s dictates: a breach of peace
may occur at any time outside an abortion clinic for which all officers on duty may well
be needed. Even without large-scale disturbances, shuffling schedules to ensure
appropriate coverage by officers while accommodating an objector could significantly tax
the scheduling capacity of the department, not to mention the superintendent’s patience.
¶94
But none of these constraints would appear to forgive the duty to make a good faith
attempt to accommodate the deeply held religious beliefs of clerks who object to
facilitating same-sex marriage. Obviously, the local marriage registrar or clerk’s office is
not a “paramilitary organization.” The clerk’s office is not charged with public safety,
and clerks are not responsible for matters of life and death as part of their job. Moreover,
clerks process applications that involve no real discretion. Same-sex couples need these
services infrequently but predictably. Putting aside the pent-up demand immediately
after recognition of same-sex marriage,254 this ministerial function is easily and
efficiently fulfilled during normal business hours, with no indication that the workload
will become less predictable overnight. Like the Title VII claims made in the clerk cases,
the ability to serve the public is unlikely to be threatened by shuffling what is a rote,
infrequent, predictable task to co-workers who have no objection.
¶95
Fourth, and perhaps most salient here, both the public protector and the clerk cases
affirm the duty to try to accommodate the religious beliefs of employees. Even in the
most hostile jurisdiction, the Seventh Circuit, government employers could and did
choose to accommodate the religious beliefs of their employees, as Rodriguez and Endres
illustrate. Both cases involved some attempt by the government agency to offer the
employee a work-around, albeit rejected by the employee, suggesting that creative
exemptions can often work without unduly interfering with the public mission.255

251

The Seventh Circuit encompasses Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin.
Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, 156 F.3d 771, 779–80 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, J., concurring).
253
The department may refuse to accommodate if no collective bargaining agreement or contract requires
otherwise, as it did in Rodriguez. See id. at 773–74.
254
For instance, in D.C., as Congress’ thirty-day review period of D.C.’s new same-sex marriage law was
ending, allowing couples to get licenses, many couples sought a license on the first day available. Long
lines thus came as no surprise. See Chuck Colbert, Same-Sex Couples Lining Up for Marriage Licenses in
D.C., DALLASVOICE.COM, Mar. 4, 2010, http://www.dallasvoice.com/artman/publish/article_12556.php.
255
See supra Part V.A.
252
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¶96

Fifth, while public confidence in government may well be in need of bolstering
today,256 open, transparent recusal can assure and foster public trust. As the Haring court
explained, “disclosure of bias and disqualification” is favored and “may not be
regarded as impairing the integrity of the [public agency’s] decision-making function.”257
¶97
At the end of the day, what matters is whether same-sex couples receive the
services needed to formalize their relationships as promptly as any other couple.258 If this
happens, then there is nothing illegitimate about the state allowing religious objectors to
act in accordance with their faith so long as it does not create an undue hardship for the
agency employing them, or, as our proposed Marriage Conscience Protection requires,
for the public itself.
VI. CONCLUSION
¶98

Allowing a public employee to act in accordance with her religious convictions by
not facilitating same-sex marriages causes deep anxiety for many. Surely, skeptics
believe, there must be some hidden cost imposed on same-sex couples, if not on the
government or the objector’s co-workers. Of particular concern is whether allowing a
religious objection will somehow erect a barrier to the right to marry because clerks
occupy an important point on the path to marriage and could theoretically lock same-sex
couples out of marriage through their refusal.
¶99
The facts on the ground in Massachusetts—which has the longest running
experience with same-sex marriage in the United States—give ample assurance that
same-sex couples will not somehow bear the cost of religious objections qualified by
hardship, as proposed here. Same-sex marriage applications comprise a miniscule part of
the overall workload in the local marriage registrar’s office. If that office is staffed by
three clerks, Faith, Hope, and Charity, and only Faith has a religious objection to
assisting with same-sex marriage applications, allowing Faith to step aside when no
hardship will result for same-sex couples is costless. If a same-sex couple, Joe and Eric,
want a marriage license today, they can be assured that if the doors are open and the
lights are on, they will receive the needed license. Hope or Charity can assist the couple,
and if Hope and Charity are not available, for reasons of sickness or planned vacation or
256

See Pew Poll: 4 Out of 5 Americans Don’t Trust Washington, USA TODAY, Apr. 19, 2010, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2010-04-19-poll-government-distrust_N.htm.
257
Haring v. Blumenthal, 471 F. Supp. 1172, 1182 (D.D.C. 1979).
258
Some may worry that even in the absence of delay, a noticeable shift of a license application from the
religious objector to a willing co-worker would impose a dignitary harm on the same-sex couple. See
Brownstein, supra note 15. As I have argued elsewhere, accommodations should and can be structured so
that “no one would ever know that a religious objector stepped aside.” See Wilson, The Calculus of
Accommodation, supra note 16, at *17. In one possible scheme, “same-sex couples are not asked to step
into another line. They are not asked to wait longer. And they don’t even know that they have been
queued to a non-objecting clerk.” Id. Such structures may not always be feasible or convenient for every
government office, however.
A harder question is whether a same-sex couple, who experiences no delay but is in fact aware that a
shift was made from one clerk to another, will nonetheless suffer a hardship. I think this is a difficult
question. But I do believe that it goes too far to say that a member of the public is harmed simply because
an exemption is granted to religious objectors if the member of the public has no personal experience of a
shift being made from one government employee to another. In such a case, it is the idea of an exemption
that gives offense, not the experience of it. If the abstract idea of a legislative exemption for one person
can by itself invalidate an exemption, there would be no room for exemptions in any context.
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any other circumstance, Faith will be required to provide the service that Joe and Eric
need.
¶100
Now, the state could tell Faith that, despite her religious objections and despite the
fact that Hope and Charity would willingly serve Joe and Eric, she must serve every
couple who presents or get out. But as this Article illustrates, there are no compelling
reasons for forcing Faith to undergo such a test of conscience. Forcing a public employee
with a religious objection to facilitate a same-sex marriage would be intolerant in the
extreme when little is to be gained by such rigid demands.
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Appendix A

1. Enacted and Proposed Religious Liberty Exemptions Vermont’s same-sex marriage
statute contains three religious liberty provisions:259
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 5144(b) (2009): (clergy solemnization): “Persons
authorized to solemnize marriage (b) This section does not require a
member of the clergy authorized to solemnize a marriage as set forth in
subsection (a) of this section, nor societies of Friends or Quakers, the
Christadelphian Ecclesia, or the Baha'i Faith to solemnize any marriage,
and any refusal to do so shall not create any civil claim or cause of
action.”
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9 § 4502(l) (2009): (public accommodations):
“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a religious organization,
association, or society, or any nonprofit institution or organization
operated, supervised, or controlled by or in conjunction with a religious
organization, association, or society, shall not be required to provide
services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges to
an individual if the request for such services, accommodations,
advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges is related to the solemnization
of a marriage or celebration of a marriage. Any refusal to provide services,
accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges in accordance
with this subsection shall not create any civil claim or cause of action.
This subsection shall not be construed to limit a religious organization,
association, or society, or any nonprofit institution or organization
operated, supervised, or controlled by or in conjunction with a religious
organization from selectively providing services, accommodations,
advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges to some individuals with respect
to the solemnization or celebration of a marriage but not to others.”
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8 § 4501(b): (fraternal organizations): “The civil
marriage laws shall not be construed to affect the ability of a society to
determine the admission of its members as provided in section 4464 of this
title, or to determine the scope of beneficiaries in accordance with section
4477 of this title, and shall not require a society that has been established
and is operating for charitable and educational purposes and which is
operated, supervised, or controlled by or in connection with a religious
organization to provide insurance benefits to any person if to do so would
violate the society's free exercise of religion, as guaranteed by the First
Amendment to the Constitution of United States or by Chapter I, Article 3
of the Constitution of the State of Vermont.”

259

An Act Relating to Civil Marriage, S.115, 2009–10 Leg. Sess. (Vt. 2009) (passed into law on April 7,
2009, over Governor's veto, effective September 1, 2009), available at
http://www.leg.state.vt.us/docs/2010/bills/Passed/S-115.pdf.

361

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

[2010

2. New Hampshire’s same-sex marriage law contains three religious liberty
provisions:260
H.B. 73 § 2: “New Paragraphs; Affirmation of Freedom of Religion in
Marriage. Amend RSA 457:37 by inserting after paragraph II the
following new paragraphs:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a religious organization,
association, or society, or any individual who is managed, directed, or
supervised by or in conjunction with a religious organization, association,
or society, or any nonprofit institution or organization operated,
supervised, or controlled by or in conjunction with a religious
organization, association, or society, shall not be required to provide
services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges to
an individual if such request for such services, accommodations,
advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges is related to the solemnization
of a marriage, the celebration of a marriage, or the promotion of marriage
through religious counseling, programs, courses, retreats, or housing
designated for married individuals, and such solemnization, celebration, or
promotion of marriage is in violation of his or her religious beliefs and
faith. Any refusal to provide services, accommodations, advantages,
facilities, goods, or privileges in accordance with this section shall not
create any civil claim or cause of action or result in any state action to
penalize or withhold benefits from such religious organization,
association, or society, or any individual who is managed, directed, or
supervised by or in conjunction with a religious organization, association,
or society, or any nonprofit institution or organization operated,
supervised, or controlled by or in conjunction with a religious
organization, association, or society.
The marriage laws of this state shall not be construed to affect the ability
of a fraternal benefit society to determine the admission of members
pursuant to RSA 418:5, and shall not require a fraternal benefit society
that has been established and is operating for charitable or educational
purposes and which is operated, supervised, or controlled by or in
connection with a religious organization to provide insurance benefits to
any person if to do so would violate the fraternal benefit society’s free
exercise of religion as guaranteed by the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution and part I, article 5 of the New Hampshire constitution.
Nothing in this chapter shall be deemed or construed to limit the
protections and exemptions provided to religious organizations under RSA
354-A:18.”
260
An Act Affirming Religious Freedom Protections with Regard to Marriage, H.B. 73, 2009 Leg. Sess.
(N.H. 2009) (signed into law on June 3, 2009, effective January 1, 2010), available at
http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/legislation/2009/HB0073.html.
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3. Connecticut’s same-sex marriage law contains three religious liberty provisions:261
2009 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 09-13 § 7: “(a) No member of the clergy
authorized to join persons in marriage pursuant to section 46b-22 of the
general statutes shall be required to solemnize any marriage in violation of
his or her right to the free exercise of religion guaranteed by the first
amendment to the United States Constitution or section 3 of article first of
the Constitution of the state. (b) No church or qualified church-controlled
organization, as defined in 26 USC 3121, shall be required to participate in
a ceremony solemnizing a marriage in violation of the religious beliefs of
that church or qualified church-controlled organization.”
2009 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 09-13 § 17: “Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, a religious organization, association or society, or any
nonprofit institution or organization operated, supervised or controlled by
or in conjunction with a religious organization, association or society,
shall not be required to provide services, accommodations, advantages,
facilities, goods or privileges to an individual if the request for such
services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods or privileges is
related to the solemnization of a marriage or celebration of a marriage and
such solemnization or celebration is in violation of their religious beliefs
and faith. Any refusal to provide services, accommodations, advantages,
facilities, goods or privileges in accordance with this section shall not
create any civil claim or cause of action, or result in any state action to
penalize or withhold benefits from such religious organization, association
or society, or any nonprofit institution or organization operated,
supervised or controlled by or in conjunction with a religious organization,
association or society.”
2009 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 09-13 § 19: “Nothing in this act shall be
deemed or construed to affect the manner in which a religious
organization may provide adoption, foster care or social services if such
religious organization does not receive state or federal funds.”
4. District of Columbia’s same-sex marriage bill contains three religious liberty
provisions:262
D.C. Marriage Bill at § 3:1-3:2:(c) No priest, minister, imam, or rabbi of
any religious denomination and no official of any nonprofit religious
organization authorized to solemnize marriages, as defined in this section,
261

An Act Implementing the Guarantee of Equal Protection under the Constitution of the State for SameSex Couples, 2009 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 09-13, § 7(a), available at
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2009/ACT/PA/2009PA-00013-R00SB-00899-PA.htm (signed into law on Apr. 23,
2009).
262
Religious Freedom and Civil Marriage Equality Amendment Act of 2009, D.C. Law No. L18-0110
(enacted Dec. 18, 2009, effective Mar. 3, 2010), available at
http://www.dccouncil.washington.dc.us/lims/legislation.aspx?LegNo=B18-0482.
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shall be required to solemnize any marriage in violation of his or her right
to the free exercise of religion guaranteed by the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution.
(d) Each religious organization, association, or society has exclusive
control over its own religious doctrine, teachings, and beliefs regarding
who may marry within that particular religious tradition’s faith, as
guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
(e) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a religious society, or a
nonprofit organization which is operated, supervised, or controlled by or
in conjunction with a religious society, shall not be required to provide
services, accommodations, facilities, or goods for a purpose related to the
solemnization or celebration of a same-sex marriage, or the promotion of
same-sex marriage through religious programs, counseling, courses, or
retreats, that is in violation of the religious society’s beliefs. A refusal to
provide services, accommodations, facilities, or goods in accordance with
this subsection shall not create any civil claim or cause of action, or result
in a District action to penalize or withhold benefits from the religious
society or nonprofit organization which is operated, supervised, or
controlled by or in conjunction with a religious society.263
Enacted But Repealed Religious Liberty Exemptions
5. Maine’s same-sex marriage law, repealed by 2009 Maine Ballot Question 1,264
contained a single religious liberty provision:265
Public Law 2009 Chapter 82 Section 3 provides that:
3. Affirmation of religious freedom. This Part does not authorize any
court or other state or local governmental body, entity, agency or
commission to compel, prevent or interfere in any way with any religious
institution's religious doctrine, policy, teaching or solemnization of
marriage within that particular religious faith's tradition as guaranteed by
the Maine Constitution, Article 1, Section 3 or the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution. A person authorized to join persons in

263

Unlike New Hampshire, Connecticut, and Vermont, D.C.’s law provides no protection for the denial of
“advantages” and “privileges.” Nor does it protect the refusal to promote a marriage through “housing
designated for married individuals,” like married student housing at a religious college.
264
Maine.gov, November 3, 2009 General Election Tabulations,
http://www.maine.gov/sos/cec/elec/2009/referendumbycounty.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2010); Abby
Goodnough, A Setback in Maine for Gay Marriage, but Medical Marijuana Law Expands, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 4, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/05/us/politics/05maine.html?_r=3 (reporting results for
eighty-seven percent of the precincts).
265
An Act to End Discrimination in Civil Marriage and Affirm Religious Freedom, ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 19-A, § 655, sub-§ 3 (signed into law on May 6, 2009, effective Sept. 12, 2009), available at
http://mainelegislature.org/legis/bills/bills_124th/chapters/PUBLIC82.asp.
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marriage and who fails or refuses to join persons in marriage is not subject
to any fine or other penalty for such failure or refusal.
Religious Liberty Exemptions in Proposed Same-Sex Marriage Legislation
New York’s same-sex marriage bill, which was ultimately rejected by the
New York Senate,266 contained one religious liberty provision:267S 4.
Subdivision 1 of section 11 of the domestic relations law, as amended by
chapter 319 of the laws of 1959, is amended to read as follows:
1. A clergyman or minister of any religion, or by the senior leader, or any
of the other leaders, of The Society for Ethical Culture in the city of New
York, having its principal office in the borough of Manhattan, or by the
leader of The Brooklyn Society for Ethical Culture, having its principal
office in the borough of Brooklyn of the city of New York, or of the
Westchester Ethical Society, having its principal office in Westchester
county, or of the Ethical Culture Society of Long Island, having its
principal office in Nassau County, or of the Riverdale-Yonkers Ethical
Society having its principal office in Bronx County, or by the leader of
any other Ethical Culture Society affiliated with the American Ethical
Union; Provided that no Clergyman, Minister Or Society for Ethical
Culture leader shall be required to solemnize any marriage when acting in
his or her capacity under this subdivision.
6. New Jersey’s same-sex marriage bill, 2008 NJ S.B. 1967, entitled "Freedom of
Religion and Equality in Civil Marriage Act," which was subsequently defeated,268
contained three exemptions:269
5. A. No member of the clergy of any religion authorized to solemnize
marriage and no religious society, institution or organization in this State
shall be required to solemnize any marriage in violation of the free
exercise of religion guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution or by Article I, paragraph 4 of the New Jersey
Constitution.
B. No religious society, institution or organization in this state serving a
particular faith or denomination shall be compelled to provide space,
266

Jeremy W. Peters, New York State Senate Votes Down Gay Marriage Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2009, at
A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/03/nyregion/03marriage.html.
267
An Act to Amend the Domestic Relations Law, in Relation to the Ability to Marry, B. A07732, 2009–
2010 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2009), available at http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=A07732&sh=t
(died in Senate on Jan. 6, 2010).
268
The bill was defeated in the New Jersey Senate in a 20-14 vote. David Kocieniewski, New Jersey
Senate Defeats Gay Marriage Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2010, at A18, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/08/nyregion/08trenton.html.
269
Freedom of Religion and Equality in Civil Marriage Act, S. 1967, 213th Sess. (N.J. 2008), available at
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2008/Bills/S2000/1967_I1.HTM (introduced June 9, 2008, subsequently
defeated).
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services, advantages, goods, or privileges related to the solemnization,
celebration or promotion of marriage if such solemnization, celebration or
promotion of marriage is in violation of the beliefs of such religious
society, institution or organization.
C. No civil claim or cause of action against any religious society,
institution or organization, or any employee thereof, shall arise out of any
refusal to provide space, services, advantages, goods, or privileges
pursuant to this section. No state action to penalize or withhold benefits
from any such religious society, institution or organization, or any
employee thereof, shall result from any refusal to provide space, services,
advantages, goods, or privileges pursuant to this section.
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Appendix B

The proposed Marriage Conscience Protection proffered by myself and others
would provide:270
Section ___
(a) Religious organizations protected.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no religious corporation, association,
educational institution, society, charity, or fraternal organization, and no individual
employed by any of the foregoing organizations, while acting in the scope of that
employment, shall be required to
(1) provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges for a
purpose related to the solemnization or celebration of any marriage; or
(2) solemnize any marriage; or
(3) treat as valid any marriage
if such providing, solemnizing, or treating as valid would cause such organizations or
individuals to violate their sincerely held religious beliefs.
(b) Individuals and small businesses protected.
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (b)(2), no individual, sole proprietor, or small
business shall be required
(A) to provide goods or services that assist or promote the solemnization or celebration
of any marriage, or provide counseling or other services that directly facilitate the
perpetuation of any marriage; or
(B) to provide benefits to any spouse of an employee; or
(C) to provide housing to any married couple if providing such goods, services,
benefits, or housing would cause such individuals or sole proprietors, or owners of such
small businesses, to violate their sincerely held religious beliefs.
(2) Paragraph (b)(1) shall not apply if
(A) a party to the marriage is unable to obtain any similar good or services,
employment benefits, or housing elsewhere without substantial hardship; or

270

Letter to Kurt Swaim, Iowa Representative (Feb. 9, 2010) (on file with author) (regarding Proposed
Iowa Provision for Religious Conscience Protection for Same-Sex Marriage). This provision refines an
earlier, less detailed model provision that my co-authors and I first suggested. See Letter from Thomas C.
Berg, Robin Fretwell Wilson, Carl H. Esbeck, & Richard W. Garnett, to John Baldacci, Governor, Maine
(Oct. 1, 2009), available at http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/wilson-et-al-to-governor-maine100509.pdf (regarding Balancing Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage with Religious Liberty).

367

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

[2010

(B) in the case of an individual who is a government employee or official, if another
government employee or official is not promptly available and willing to provide the
requested government service without inconvenience or delay.
(3) A “small business” within the meaning of paragraph (b)(1) is a legal entity other than
a natural person
(A) that provides services which are primarily performed by an owner of the business;
or
(B) that has five or fewer employees; or
(C) in the case of a legal entity that offers housing for rent, that owns five or fewer
units of housing.
(c) No civil cause of action or other penalties.
No refusal to provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or
privileges protected by this section shall
(1) create any civil claim or cause of action; or
(2) result in any action by the State or any of its subdivisions to penalize or withhold
benefits from any protected entity or individual, under any laws of this State or its
subdivisions, including but not limited to laws regarding employment discrimination,
housing, public accommodations, educational institutions, licensing, government
contracts or grants, or tax-exempt status.
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